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UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURSES
FREDERIC M. BLOOM*
ABSTRACT

By now, we almost expect Congress to fail. Nearly every time the
federal courts announce a controversial decision, Congress issues a call to
rein in "runaway" federal judges. And nearly every time Congress makes a
"jurisdiction-stripping" threat, it comes to nothing.
But if Congress's threats possess little fire, we have still been distracted
by their smoke. This Article argues that Congress's noisy calls have
obscured another potent threat to the "judicial Power": the Supreme Court
itself. On occasion, this Article asserts, the Court reshapes and abuses the
"judicial Power"-not through bold pronouncements or obvious doctrinal
revisions, but through something more inconspicuous, more discreet: the
prescription of unconstitutional decisionmaking procedures. These
decisionmaking procedures-what this Article calls "unconstitutional
courses"-have attracted little sustained attention; their unexpected source
and their subtle form make these "courses" too easy to ignore. Yet where
Congress has so often failed, the Court has quietly succeeded. By charting
* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University. J.D. (2002), Stanford. I am
grateful to Janet Alexander, Andy Chasin, Eric Claeys, Kareem Crayton, Dick Fallon,
George Fisher, Joel Goldstein, Pam Karlan, Josh Klein, Evan Tsen Lee, Jonathan Masur,
John Mikhail, Sanjay Mody, Camille Nelson, Todd Pettys, Chris Rickerd, Larry Sager,
David Sloss, Larry Solum, and Larry Yackle for their careful insight and generous
guidance. Ben Aranda, Chris LaRose, and Lori Owens offered expert research and
logistical support. Barry Wormser and the staff at the Law Quarterly provided kind and
thoughtful editorial work.

1679

1680

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 83:1679

"unconstitutional courses," the Court has refashioned the "judicial Power"
in an untenable way.
To show how, this Article examines what "unconstitutional courses"
are, when the Court has charted them, and why these "courses" merit
consideration. As a part of this analysis, this Article identifies two
"unconstitutional courses," one historic and one contemporary. The first
"course" grows out of Swift v. Tyson, a well-known (if long-derided)
discussion of federal common law; the second emerges in Williams v.
Taylor, a significant chapter in the story of contemporary habeas law. Both
Swift and Williams illustrate the importance of how courts make
decisions-what law they consider, what facts they ignore, what analytical
steps they take. Both Swift and Williams demonstrate the impact a court's
decisionmaking "course" may (and does) have in resolving individual
disputes and in shaping the "judicial Power." And both Swift and Williams
exhibit the need to examine the Court's less obvious threats to individual
rights-and to itself.
INTRODUCTION

There is little new glory in the battle over federal court power. In each
bloodless clash, the patterns grow more familiar, the rhetoric more
timeworn. Legislators rally to repel judicial efforts to "redefine our
history." 1 Famous names-Michael Newdow, 2 Terri Schiavo3-become
code for judicial arrogance, emblems of supposedly "rogue" federal
4

courts.

All the while, the ground beneath the federal courts' relationship with
Congress shifts. The relationship has never been easy.5 Almost from the

1. Carl Hulse, House Passes CourtLimits on Pledge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2004, at A 17 ("'We
can't let rogue judges redefine our history,' Representative Steve Chabot, Republican of Ohio, said.").
2. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
3. See, e.g., Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 544 U.S. 957 (2005).
4. Hulse, supra note 1.
5. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager, Congress as Partner/ Congress as Adversary, 22 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 85, 85-86 (1998). Article Ill of the United States Constitution invests the Supreme
Court with "appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.
2. Congress's power to make
"Exceptions" and "Regulations" to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction has, at times, been
construed quite broadly, see generally Ex Porte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869), and
though the "Exceptions and Regulations" clause says nothing about congressional control over inferior
federal court jurisdiction, Congress's power to shape that jurisdiction has long been understood to be
at least as expansive. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49 (1850) (acknowledging
that Congress had no obligation to create lower federal courts in the first place, so it must have broad
power to remove cases from their jurisdiction).
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beginning, Congress and the courts have existed in a quarrelsome
counterpoise, a state of anxious push-pull. 6 This inter-institutional anxiety
is never more apparent than when7 federal courts issue controversial
decisions-like Newdow or Schiavo.
Some of these controversial decisions inspire angry legislative rhetoric,
"threat[s]" intended to force "tactical [judicial] recessions. 8 Others
prompt immediate popular discord--occasionally so much so that we
amend the Constitution.10
And many of these decisions provoke a now-predictable congressional
response: legislative attempts to curb federal court jurisdiction. 1' The goal

6. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 49 (1980)
("Almost two hundred years of judicial review show many periods of serious popular and political
disagreement with the Court's work."); id. at 130; see also Peter L. Strauss, Courts or Tribunals?
Federal Courts and the Common Law, 53 ALA. L. REV. 891, 894 (2002) ("We are again, at least
ostensibly, in a [judicial] retreat phase.") (citation omitted); cf Adrian Vermeule, The JudicialPower
in the State (and Federal) Courts, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 357, 361 (2000) ("Predictable and insistent
cognitive pressures [] cause judges to press judicial prerogatives to implausible extremes.").
7. 1 use the term "controversial" to denote some significant level of political or cultural
unpopularity, not to indicate incorrectness (or correctness) as a matter of law. Cf Gerald Gunther,
CongressionalPower to CurtailFederal Court Jurisdiction:An OpinionatedGuide to the Ongoing
Debate,36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 896 (1984) (discussing "controversial federal court decisions").
8. See CHOPER, supra note 6, at 57; ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA

OF PROGRESS 94-95 (1970). For a brief discussion of a recent political "threat," see Editorial, The
Judges Made Them Do It, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2005, at A22, recounting Senator John Comyn's claim
that "distress about judges who 'are making political decisions yet are unaccountable to the public
...
builds up and builds up to the point where some people engage in' violence." Senator Comyn's
intemperate comments were widely criticized, but his remarks may reflect a strategy with a solid
historical provenance.
9. See

generally

LARRY

D.

KRAMER,

THE

PEOPLE

THEMSELVES:

POPULAR

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW chs. 1-3 (2004); CHOPER, supra note 6, at 128.
10. See Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L.
REV. 747, 776 (1991) ("[T]he prospect of constitutional amendments reversing Court decisions might
have substantially ameliorated the countermajoritarian difficulty had obtaining such amendments
proven as easy as the eleventh amendment's overruling of Chisholm v. Georgia. But this has not been
the case; the Chisholm scenario has been repeated just three times in the Court's history, and on one of
these occasions only a civil war made the amendment possible.") (citations omitted); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 46 (1980).

i1. Proposals to strip federal courts of jurisdiction surface "in virtually every period of
controversial federal court decisions." Gunther, supra note 7, at 895-97 (listing jurisdiction-stripping
efforts in the Marshall Court years, in the 1950s, and in more recent decades-the last in response to
court decisions on "hot button" social issues like school prayer); see also David Currie, The ThreeJudge District Court in ConstitutionalLitigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1964) ("[E]very important
decision ... has brought forth a rash of irresponsible proposals to limit the Court's jurisdiction .. ");
David Luban, The Warren Court and the Concept of a Right, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7, 9 (1999).
It may still be true, of course, that "people talk about wholesale jurisdiction-stripping far more than
[Congress] actually do[es] it." Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of
JudicialDecision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 191 (2001). But when Justice O'Connor noted
that the contemporary battles over the Court's jurisdictional reach are not "new," she could hardly
have been standing on firmer historical ground. David Stout, 3 Justices Respond Personally To
Criticism of US. Judiciary,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2005, at A18.

1682

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 83:1679

of these jurisdiction-stripping efforts is always the same: to scale back the
power of federal judges.' 2 But the fate3 of these bills has rarely varied, and
nearly all have failed to become law.'
There may be a lesson in this history of congressional failure. The
record may suggest that Congress's serial "jurisdiction-stripping" efforts
are little more than political theater, an easy (if polemical) way for
legislators to score political points.' 4 It may even suggest that the federal
courts are in no real danger, that the "judicial Power"' 5 is unthreatened-at
least by Congress.
But Congress is not the exclusive threat to the "judicial Power." A
significant portion of that role, this Article contends, has passed to a rather
unlikely source: the Supreme Court itself. The Court has not adopted this
role casually or conspicuously; its self-abnegating efforts appear only like
"shadows on cave walls." 1 6 But these "shadows" are far from illusive; they
are real and powerful, perhaps even more so than Congress's direct and
unambiguous attempts to curtail the power of the federal courts.
In the last decade, the Court has accomplished what Congress has long
been unable-because of political inability and because of the Court's
jealous protection of its own power 7 - to do itself: to shape the "judicial
Power" in an untenable way. The Court has done so, unobtrusively
enough, by prescribing unconstitutional decisionmaking procedures-that
'8
is, by charting what this Article calls "unconstitutional courses."'

12. Not all of Congress's attempts to restrict jurisdiction are functionally identical: Some sweep
broadly, seeking to scale back the jurisdiction of all federal courts; some aim to limit Supreme Court
jurisdiction in a specific subset of cases; still others target only the jurisdiction of inferior federal
courts.

13. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 7, at 897. The exception is Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 506 (1868).
14. See, e.g., John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
InstitutionalizingJudicialRestraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 969 (2002); see also Strauss, supra note
6, at 908 ("The spectre of judges who might run amok has a distinguished political history in this
country .... ); Hulse, supranote 1, at A 17.
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual
Power ": The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 696 (1998).
16. John Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie,87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 696 (1974).
17. See generally CHOPER, supranote 6, at 380-415.
18. 1 borrow this appellation from Justice Reed. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 91
(1938) (Reed, J., concurring) ("The 'unconstitutional' course referred to in the majority opinion is
apparently the ruling in Swift v. Tyson that the supposed omission of Congress to legislate as to the
effect of decisions leaves federal courts free to interpret general law for themselves."). Others have
used the phrase "unconstitutional course" as well, though rarely in the way I use the term here-viz.,
as a metaphor for impermissible, Court-prescribed decisional methodologies. See Dennis J.
Hutchinson, "The Achilles Heel" of the Constitution: Justice Jackson and the Japanese Exclusion
Cases, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 455, 464 (2002) ("Judicial commitments become recorded as precedents.
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Over the last half-century, the legal academy has examined countless
aspects of federal court jurisdiction-so much so that the discipline may
be, in the words of Professor Van Alstyne, "choking on redundancy." '1 9
Some have engaged in famous dialectical exercises, drawing the parallel
between "the power to regulate jurisdiction" and the "power to regulate
rights. 2 ° Others have looked closely at the precarious nature of the CourtCongress partnership, reminding that "Congress is not entitled to make
itself the Court's adversary. 2 1 Some have chronicled less obvious sources
of congressional authority, spotting the many ways Congress "regulates
the manner in which federal courts exercise their jurisdiction. 22 And still
others have located the notion of "regulat[ing] rights" in broader
institutional and historical context, stressing the "pointless [ness]"
of
23
absent.
necessarily
are
remedies
where
contexts
in
review
judicial
But very little of this "mountain of scholarship ' 24 examines the Court's
(generally modem) tendency to enfeeble its own "judicial Power., 25 And
none of this work explores the Court's occasional forging of
"unconstitutional
courses,"
Court-prescribed but constitutionally
impermissible methods of federal court decisionmaking. This Article
attempts to fill these notable gaps-and to show how the two gaps fit
together.

The courts cannot be extricated from an unconstitutional course or unconstitutional principles rooted
out of its practice merely by an election, as can be done in the case of the President or Congress.");
Louise Weinberg, The Article III Box: The Power of "Congress" to Attack the "Jurisdiction" of
"Federal Courts," 78 TEX. L. REV. 1405, 1409 (2000) ("I do not suggest that the Court will declare
unconstitutional the 'course' it is 'pursuing."') (quoting Robert H. Jackson, Undated Draft, Box 128
(on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division)).
19. Professor Cole has made the same point in much the same way. See David Cole, Jurisdiction
and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits on Congress's Control of Federal
Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2481 (1998) (citing Gunther, supra note 7, at 897 n.9 (quoting a letter
from Professor Van Alstyne to Professor Gunther (Feb. 28, 1983))). And as Professor Cole pithily
noted, "[h]ere we go again"--as we do here, albeit in a different direction. Id.
20. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof FederalCourts: An
Exercise in Dialectic,66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1371 (1953).
21. Sager, supra note 5, at 86 (emphasis omitted); see also Lawrence G. Sager, Klein's First
Principle:A ProposedSolution, 86 GEO. L.J. 2525 (1998) [hereinafter Klein's First Principle].
22. Lawson, supra note 11, at 191 (emphasis omitted) (referencing, e.g., John Harrison, The
Power of Congress Over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DuKE L.J. 503 (2000); Martin H. Redish, Federal
JudicialIndependence: Constitutionaland PoliticalPerspectives,46 MERCER L. REV. 697 (1995)).
23. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and
ConstitutionalRemedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 369-70 (1993); see also Lawrence G. Sager, Fair
Measure: The Legal Status of UnderenforcedConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
24. Vermeule, supra note 6, at 358.
25. See Weinberg, supra note 18, at 1421 (noting the "hostility of courts to themselves... a kind
ofjudicial self-loathing").
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To that end, this Article puts forward two primary claims. The first
claim is largely theoretical: I argue that the Court occasionally requires
federal courts to make decisions in unconstitutional ways- to adopt, that
is, "unconstitutionally wrongheaded ' 26 decisionmaking procedures. With
these "unconstitutional courses," the central concern is not necessarily the
outcome reached. The principal concern is how the court makes
decisions-what law it considers, what facts it ignores, what analytical
steps it takes.
But if the problem is primarily one of process-if the Court's
"shadows" reflect means, not ends-are unconstitutional courses truly
problematic? Are these supposed "unconstitutional courses" real,
detectable, and important?
This Article's second claim is that unconstitutional courses do more
than raise trivial questions about form and methodology; they raise
legitimate and important questions about the operation of the federal
courts and the scope of individual rights. In support, this Article examines
two unconstitutional courses, one historic and one contemporary-and
both quite prominent. The historic example reaches back to Swift v. Tyson,
a decision that invited inferior federal courts to create a kind of federal
common law.27 The more contemporary example concentrates on Williams
v. Taylor, a decision that interprets central portions of the Anti-terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).28 In both Swift and Williams,
this Article contends, the Court designed unconstitutional decisionmaking
systems. And in one (viz., Williams) more than the other, the Court raised
serious concerns about federal court integrity, individual litigants'
rights,
29
Power."
"judicial
the
of
conception
Court's
Supreme
the
and
A few comments about the scope of this Article should be made at the
outset. To start, it is important to stress that this piece does not pretend to
explore every "unconstitutional course" that the Court has charted. It
merely attempts to take the first step in a more comprehensive
examination of these "courses,', 30 using two salient examples to give the
thesis more distinct shape.

26. See Lawson, supra note 11, at 211.
27. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). See also Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
28. 529 U.S. 420 (2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000).
29. These functional, institutional, and structural ideas are explored at greater length, infra
sections I11and IV. Cf Irons v. Carey, 408 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2005) (ordering the government to "be
prepared to give an indication" of section 2254(d)'s constitutionality "in light of Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (I Cranch.) 137 (1803), and City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997)"); Irons v.
Carey, No. 05-15275, order at 1-2 (9th Cir. May 18, 2005) (same).
30. Other "courses" may emerge in the Court's Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity
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It is equally important to stress this Article's modest claim to
originality in discussing the Court's recent habeas jurisprudence. Since its
passage, AEDPA-and the seismic shift in habeas jurisprudence 32
it
represents 3'-has proven an unusually fertile ground for debate.
Thoughtful, often clever readings of the statute's text have been
proposed;33 the habeas "mousetrap" has been redesigned;3 4 and AEDPA
has been located in historical, social, and penological context. 35 This piece
will not revisit much of that work. Nor does this piece intend to offer an
exhaustive account of Erie doctrine, judicial misallocation of
decisionmaking authority, or the rights-remedies chasm. Rather, this
Article aims to tease out a narrow, if far-reaching, jurisdictional idea, a
thesis that touches directly on fundamental constitutional concerns.36
This Article is separated into five parts. Part I develops the idea of an
"unconstitutional course"-the notion that the Court has, on occasion,
propounded impermissible
and unconstitutional
decisionmaking
frameworks. As part I explains, not all contentious Supreme Court
decisions blaze unconstitutional courses; indeed, very few do. But there
exists a small subset of Supreme Court opinions that do more than require
inferior federal courts to adhere to dubious-even subsequently

doctrines. Cf.Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 636 (1993) (discussing
the "[a]doption of the reasonableness standard" in these-and other-contexts). See also Louise
Weinberg, When Courts Decide Elections: The Constitutionalityof Bush v. Gore, 82 B.U. L. REV. 609
(2000) (positing Bush v. Gore as a kind of "unconstitutional course"-albeit one without obvious
ancestry or progeny).
31. When a petition will be reviewed on the merits, how it would be considered, what claims may
be presented, why a state court's decision may be displaced-under AEDPA, the answers to all of
these questions changed. See, e.g., Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of the New Habeas Statute: An
(Opinionated)User's Manual, 51 VAND. L. REV. 103, 106-07 (1998).
32. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 19, at 2481; Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal
Jurisdiction:Allocating Cases Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211 (2004)
(citing, e.g., Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 45 VAND. L. REV. 797, 799-802 (1992); Barry
Friedman, Pas De Deux: The Supreme Court and the Habeas Courts, 66 S.CAL. L. REV. 2467, 2467
(1993); James S.Liebman, An "Effective Death Penalty?" AEDPA and Error Detection in Capital
Cases, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 411, 414 (2001); James S. Liebman, Opting for Real Death Penalty

Reform, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 315, 333-36 (2002)); see also Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus
Jurisdiction:The Limits of Models, 66 S.CAL. L. REV. 2507 (1993).
33. See, e.g., Tsen Lee, supra note 31.
34. Tung Yin, A Better Mousetrap: ProceduralDefault as a Retroactivity Alternative to Teague
v. Lane and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 203
(1998).
35. See Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381
(1996).
36. One such concern is the lack of a direct inter-institutional check on the Court's intrainstitutional efforts. See infra Parts I and IV; Lawson, supra note 11, at 195 (noting that there is very
little Congress can do "even if the courts' own methods for deciding cases... are unconstitutionally

wrong").
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changed-interpretations of substantive law. Decisions within this small
subset affirmatively force courts to decide cases in unconstitutional
ways-by ignoring things that should not be ignored, considering things
that should not be considered, and asking questions that should not be
asked.
Part II locates the idea of unconstitutional courses in historical context.
To this end, part II briefly reviews Swift v. Tyson, exploring both the
theoretical and the functional problems with Swift's decisionmaking
methodology. Part II then draws the analysis back to the broader
unconstitutional course thesis, briefly noting the ways in which Swift is
(and is not) a troubling decisional model.
Part III discusses a second unconstitutional course, one that governs a
significant portion of contemporary habeas corpus law. As a part of this
analysis, part III offers an opinionated review of Williams v. Taylor, the
Court's recent interpretation of AEDPA's "state review" provision. Part
III then explains how this interpretation requires courts to make decisions
in impermissible ways-and how it forges a kind of constitutional
purgatory, a doctrinal nether-region in which federal courts are required to
ratify constitutional error.37
Part IV examines the more troubling aspects of unconstitutional
courses, especially those of a modem stripe. Some of these
unconstitutional courses, part IV explains, run impermissible means to
impermissible ends; they force, that is, federal courts to reach
unconstitutional outcomes. 38 As this happens, unconstitutional courses
stray into precarious theoretical and doctrinal territory.3 9 Part IV surveys
this territory, asking (and briefly answering) a number of pressing "courserelated" questions: Are there inter-institutional checks on Court-made
unconstitutional courses? If not, how far may these courses go? May the
Court redefine full categories of substantive protections simply by crafting
"deferential" procedural models?
Part V closes this Article, noting that Congress's almost habitual
jurisdiction-stripping efforts may continue to fall short-but that, in their

37. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 (2002); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000).
38. See Gunther, supra note 7, at 910.
[V]irtually all the commentators agree that, even if Congress can withdraw jurisdiction from
the federal courts in a whole class of cases, it cannot allow a federal court jurisdiction but
dictate the outcomes of cases, or require a court to decide cases in disregard of the
Constitution. That is a significant limitation.
Id. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 886; Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation,
and the Legislative Power, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 888, 954 (1998).
39. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
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noisy failure, they may obscure another potent threat to the "judicial
Power."
I. UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURSES
Imagine that the Supreme Court required all civil rights claims to be
decided by flipping a coin.4 ° Or that all antitrust issues were to be resolved
questions
by consulting a "Delphic oracle. ''4 1 Or even that all copyright
42
were to be answered by "studying the entrails of a dead fowl.
Something about these instructions seems--even feels-wrong, if still
curiously close to reality.43 But what about these instructions is so
unacceptable? Nothing about the coin or the oracle or the entrails ensures
that a court will reach the wrong result in any particular case, so what
prohibits the Court from making such demands?
The answer, 44 of course, has to do with process-and the deep
procedural flaws in these coin-flipping, oracle-consulting, and entrailsstudying models.45 "Procedure" has never been easy to define.4 6 In some
contexts, "procedure" is merely a collection of "decision rules," a set of
baseline standards that shape the mechanics of adjudication; 47 in others, it
is an alternative to (or bar against) consideration of the merits of a case; 48

40. See, e.g., LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski,
J., concurring) ("I would call the case differently if the agreement provided that the district judge
would review the award by flipping a coin or studying the entrails of a dead fowl.").
41. See, e.g., Jackson v. City of Chicago, 215 F. Supp. 2d 975, 977 (N.D. I11.2002) ("What is
thus called for at this point is a divination of entrails, without even the benefit of an opaque
pronouncement from any Delphic oracle.").
42. LaPine, 130 F.3d at 891 (Kozinski, J., concurring). Entrails of various types occupy a
surprisingly prominent spot in federal doctrine. See, e.g., Artway v. Att'y Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235,
1272 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Any efforts of the lower courts in the federal system to interpret the sometimes
Delphic pronouncements from the Supreme Court can on occasion resemble (to mix metaphors) the
divination of entrails."); Salem Nat. Bank v. Smith, 890 F.2d 22, 24 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Appellate
opinions are not like the entrails of sheep, to be read for omens.").
43. See, e.g., Reyes v. Seifert, 125 F. App'x 788, 789 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding no remediable
injury where a juror "based his decision to vote guilty on the result of a coin flip").
44. Perhaps this answer is only the most obvious of many, but it is the one that matters here.
45. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory
Independence and the Values of ProceduralDue Process,95 YALE L.J. 455, 472 (1986).
46. See Lawrence B. Solum, ProceduralJustice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 193 (2004).
47. Id. at 201 (citing Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules. On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984)). Perhaps the most famous heuristic for
dividing procedural from substantive is Justice Harlan's "primary"-or-"secondary" test in Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). This test has proven quite durable, see
Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2523-24 (2004), but it is not without its critics. See Ely, supra
note 16, at 699-700.
48. Retroactivity, adequate and independent state grounds, and procedural default all raise
questions here, especially in the habeas context. In each, "procedure" seems to take a rather
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in still others, it is whatever "substantive law" is not.4 9 All of these
definitions prove somehow accurate, if only partially so. 50
And all of these definitions imply something unremarkable: Procedure
matters. It matters enough, in fact, that some procedural errors face real (if
imperfect 51 ) doctrinal restraints.52
But not all types of procedure confront similar limits, even when they
touch the heart of the adjudicative system. There is no robust restraint, for
example, on the specific decisionmaking steps that courts take or the
analytical procedures that courts follow. When federal courts make
decisions in subtly 53 unconstitutional ways, in fact, there may be nothing
to stop them.
But why is this so? Do the courts' decisionmaking procedures simply
not matter? Do they matter only in extreme cases? Or might these
decisionmaking procedures present real (constitutional) problems-even
in cases not involving coins, oracles, or entrails?
To begin answering these questions, this section develops the idea of
"unconstitutional courses." Subsection A offers an initial explanation of
what these "courses" are and why these courses are so often overlooked; it
also puts forward an (intentionally implausible) example of an
impermissible decisionmaking procedure, attempting to draw the broader
"unconstitutional course" idea into greater focus. Subsection B then
describes what "unconstitutional courses" are not, carefully distinguishing
these courses from other types of Court-made unconstitutionality.

idiosyncratic form. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110
YALE L.J. 947, 996 (2001) ("Of course, what is procedure for purposes of retroactivity differs from
what is procedure for purposes of what law emanating from another jurisdiction a forum state must
enforce." (citing Walter W. Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE
L.J. 333, 341-43 (1933))).
49. Some follow a kind of intuitionist's approach to the procedure-substance divide, believing
that they will know procedure when they see it. But cf Solum, supra note 46, at 194-95 (debunking
this notion). But no matter what definitional framework one uses, the lines are quite "hazy." Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring). Even Professor Ely's famous
taxonomy draws rather fine distinctions. See Ely, supra note 16, at 724-25 (Procedural rules are
"designed to make the process of litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the resolution of
disputes"; substantive law is law governing a right granted for some purpose not related to "the
fairness or efficiency of the litigation process.") (citations omitted).
50. See Solum, supra note 46, at 183.
5 1. See Stephen Reinhardt, The Anatomy of an Execution: "'Fairness" v. Process, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 313, 320 (1999).
52. Errors in the appellate process, see, for example, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956);
errors in trial argument, see, for example, New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310, 312-13
(1929), and errors involving the jury, see for example, Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005);
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005), all fit this mold.
53. Coin-flipping, oracle-consulting, and entrails-studying are anything but subtle.
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A. What They Are
So why do the courts' decisionmaking procedures attract so little
attention? If it is truly "silly to say that the core of the judicial power is
merely the power to reach a result," why is it so
54 easy to ignore the
analytical "process by which that result is reached"?
Part of reason is the shrouded character of judicial decisionmakingwhat Justice Cardozo called the mysterious "brew[ing]" of a "strange
compound... in the caldron of the courts. 5 5 Since even judges labor to
describe the "process[es] ... followed" in deciding cases, it is no surprise

that those processes often avoid sustained critical attention.
Another part of reason is a nearly compulsive focus on outcomes-a
consequentialist 56) sense that it is ends that matter, not
(powerfully
57
means.

And another, more substantial part of the reason that courts'
decisionmaking procedures attract scant attention is the unlikely source

54. Lawson, supranote 11, at 211.
55.

BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 9 (1931) ("Any judge, one

might suppose, would find it easy to describe the [decisionmaking] process which he had followed
.... Nothing could be farther from the truth."). There are, Justice Cardozo suggests, a number of
ingredients added to the decisional "brew":
What is it that I do when I decide a case? To what sources of information do I appeal for
guidance? In what proportions do I permit them to contribute to the result? In what
proportions ought they to contribute? If a precedent is applicable, when do I refuse to follow
it? If no precedent is applicable, how do I reach the rule that will make precedent for the
future? If I am seeking logical consistency, the symmetry of the legal structure, how far shall
I seek it? At what point shall the quest be halted by some discrepant custom, by some
consideration of the social welfare, by my own or the common standards of justice and
morals?
Id. at 10. See also KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 53-54
(1960); Jerome Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 U. ILL. L. REV. 645, 653-55 (1932); Joseph C.
Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decisions, 14
CORNELL L.Q. 274, 281-82, 285 (1929). For an illuminating discussion of these seminal works, see
Linda Ross Meyer, Is PracticalReason Mindless?, 86 GEO. L.J. 647, 650-51, 675 (1998).
56. Or utilitarian. See Solum, supra note 46, at 185.
57. The goal of the adjudicative system is, after all, reliable outcomes. Callins v. Collins, 510
U.S. 1141, 1144-45 (1994) ("Courts are in the very business of erecting procedural devices from
which fair, equitable, and reliable outcomes are presumed to flow.") (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Warren Burger, Lawrence Cooke: A Tireless JudicialAdministrator, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 147, 147
(1984) ("[T]he courts and their procedures, like the legal profession and the laws, are not ends in
themselves but a means to an end-a tool-and the end is the proper administration of justice."). But
there is still a rather sinister chapter in the consequentialist's story, one in which core procedural rights
transform into fungible things, systemic "costs" easy enough to bargain away. See John C. Jeffries, Jr.,
The Right-Remedy Gap in ConstitutionalLaw, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 87-88 (1999) (exploring the "gaps"
that develop between rights and remedies); Sam Kamin, Harmless Errorand the Rights / Remedies
Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1 (2002); Sager, supra note 23, at 1224 (discussing discrepancies in "the scope
of the norms of the Constitution and the scope of their judicial enforcement").
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from which the most sinister procedures sometimes emerge: the Supreme
Court itself. On occasion, the Court will build unconstitutional
decisionmaking frameworks, systems that require inferior federal courtsand, ultimately, the Court itself-to make decisions in unconstitutional
ways. Most (if not all) of these Court-prescribed decisionmaking methods
appear superficially innocuous and outcome-neutral: 58 No entrails are
involved; no particular outcome is foreordained.
But the core constitutional problem with these decisional structures is
not one of plainly absurd decisional techniques; nor is it one of
(predetermined) ends. The central problem is one of discreet analytical
means-of facts improperly ignored, of law impermissibly considered, of
questions misguidedly asked. The central problem, in short, is the
"unconstitutional course" 59 that the Court charts.
This is surely a bit too abstract. 60 To bring this "unconstitutional
course" idea into greater focus, it may help to consider an example, one
with a touch of exaggeration. So imagine (again) that the Supreme Court
61
has required all civil rights claims to be decided by flipping a coin.
Imagine, too, that Plaintiff P has filed a civil rights claim in federal court.
As it happens, Plaintiff P's claim is a strong one, and it possesses more
than ample factual and legal support. 62 Under the Court's coin-flipping
model, however, the strength of Plaintiff P's claim does not matter. All
that matters is what the coin says.
Of course, nothing about the Court's coin-flipping model guarantees an
incorrect substantive result. The coin may provide the "correct"
substantive answer in Plaintiff P's case; it may not.
But whatever outcome the coin generates, the court will have reached
its conclusion in an impermissible way-through an untenable
decisionmaking "course." As a part of this impermissible coin-flipping
course, the court will have systematically disregarded important
information (e.g., the specific facts and merits of Plaintiff P's particular
claim). As a part of this coin-flipping course, the court will have ignored

58. Cf.Burt Neubome, The Myth of Parity,90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1977).
59. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 91 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring). Compare what
Professor Lawson has deemed, in a separate context, "unconstitutionally wrongheaded[] method[s] of
decision-making." Lawson, supra note 11, at 211.
60. Cf.Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 269
(1975).
61. See, e.g., LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski,
J., concurring).
62. Plaintiff P's claim, for example, runs into no qualified immunity bars. See generally Saucier
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
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relevant sources of law while considering prohibited ones (e.g., the coin).63
And as a part of this course, the court will have asked the wrong legal and
factual questions (e.g., heads or tails?).
Things are rarely so blatant. Few of the Court's procedural
"wol[ves]" 64 take such obvious and ominous form. But the absurdity of
this coin-flipping example should not obscure its essential (if banal)
lesson: How courts make decisions can be quite important. At times, in
fact, how courts make decisions can be unconstitutional.
B. What They Aren't
But this paints only half of the necessary picture. It is surely important
to specify what an unconstitutional course is. But it is just as important to
specify what an unconstitutional course is not, if only to show that
unconstitutional courses will not (conveniently) appear wherever one
might hope to find them.
So what isn't an "unconstitutional course"?
An unconstitutional course is not simply a disagreeable decision of
substantive law. In the process of interpreting the Sixth Amendment, for
example, the Court may reach a debatable, subjectively problematic, or
even subsequently-changed interpretation of the confrontation clause.65
Academics and other federal judges (including other members of the
Supreme Court) may disagree with the Court's final, controlling
interpretation. These critics may even think that the Court's decision is
"unconstitutional" inasmuch as it conflicts with their own measures of the
meaning of the Sixth Amendment.66
But this type of substantive (interpretative) disagreement matters very
little, at least in a narrow sense. When the Supreme Court says that the
confrontation clause means X, X is what the confrontation clause meansofficially, if not epistemologically. 67 X is, to echo a familiar maxim, "the

63. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
64. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]his wolf comes
as a wolf.").
65. Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (abrogating Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56
(1980)). Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("Bowers v. Hardwick[, 478 U.S. 186
(1986),] should be and now is overruled."); Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) ("Any
language in Plessy v. Ferguson[, 163 U.S. 537 (1896),] contrary to this finding is rejected.").
66. Or, perhaps, the judges' own "good conscience." See Rico v. Terhune, 63 F. App'x 394 (9th
Cir. 2003) (Pregerson, J., dissenting in part).
67. This oversimplifies the debate fairly significantly, but the relevant point remains: When a
majority of Supreme Court Justice interprets a particular provision of substantive law to mean X, that
is what the provision means.
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law of the land., 68 An inferior federal court may not disregard the Xinterpretation when applying the confrontation clause, even if the lower
court thinks the clause should mean y.69
Were the Supreme Court to reinterpret all of the Bill of Rights in a
particularly insidious way, in fact, no "unconstitutional course" would
necessarily emerge-not because the Supreme Court's authority to declare
what the law "is" makes the institution intellectually
infallible, but because
70
that authority makes it substantively "right.
When the Court does chart an unconstitutional course, the primary
concern is not substantive law-whether the Sixth Amendment,7 1 the
Rules of Decision Act,72 or otherwise. The central problem is how federal
courts may (or must) go about making decisions: how the federal courts
must systematically disregard important information; 73 how the courts
must consider prohibited sources of law; 74 how the courts must contravene
established definitions of substantive law; and how the courts must reach
outcomes in a manner inconsistent with-and antithetical to-the
Constitution itself.
In some contexts, this is more than problem enough. Since how a court
answers a question can be as important as what it decides-Justice
Cardozo's skepticism notwithstanding 75-a
flawed decisionmaking
method raises serious analytical and constitutional concerns.76 These

68. See CHOPER, supra note 6, at 6.
69. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution:An Essay on Constitutional
Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 570, 570-71 n.l (2001) (citing, for example, Larry Alexander,
Constrainedby Precedent, 63 S.CAL. L. REv. 1, 4 (1989); Frederick Schauer, Precedent,39 STAN. L.
REv. 571, 575 (1987));

see also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 113 (1978)

(discussing the idea of "precedent"). Adherence to the "powerful" doctrine of stare decisis on matters
of substantive law, however unpleasant, is simply the role of inferior federal courts-as well as the
basis of a properly functioning judiciary. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 861 (1992) (O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). Which is not to say that a principled
theory of precedent exists. All we have-as Judge Easterbrook explains-is a "grand balancing test,
[one] with no maximand nor weights to produce a decision where criteria are in conflict." Frank H.
Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in JudicialDecisions, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 422, 422 (1988); cf.
CHOPER, supra note 6, at 148-55, and accompanying notes (discussing "[t]he substantial number of
instances in which lower courts (state as well as federal) and law enforcement officials have sought to
subvert [] []Court[] decisions").
70. As Justice Jackson rather famously noted, the Court is "not final because [it is] infallible";
the Court is "infallible only because [it is] final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
71. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000).
73. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (Pet. 16) 1 (1842).
74. The "brooding omnipresence in the sky" is likely the most recognizable-if now vilified-of
these sources, See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
75. See CARDOZO, supra note 55, at 9; LLEWELLYN, supra note 55, at 53-54.
76. These concerns are discussed at length, infra Parts II, Ill, and IV.
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concerns are evident, even obvious when the decisionmaking method
involves flipping coins or studying entrails.
But these concerns are no less important, no less pressing when the
decisionmaking method takes less conspicuous form. In Swift v. Tyson, the
Court propounded just this type of flawed-but-inconspicuous
decisionmaking system. It has done so again in Williams v. Taylor. The
sections that follow examine and compare these unconstitutional courses.
Neither Swift's nor Williams' course is as manifestly peculiar as the
flipping of coins or the studying of entrails. 77 But each course proves that
the courts' specific decisionmaking structures merit serious inquiry-not
simply as a nod to "procedure for procedure's 79sake, ' 78 but as a critical
record of the rise and fall of the "judicial Power.,
II. HISTORY'S MODEL: SWIFT' S UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURSE
80
Nearly every law student remembers something about Swift v. Tyson.
The question of New York banking law, the strained interpretation of the
Rules of Decision Act,8' the "breaching [of] the line between prescriptive
and interpretive power" 82-all of these things sound at least faintly
familiar, if only as a prelude to Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. 83 To many of
these students, Swift recalls a particular type of "bad ' 84 law, one of those
few cases eventually deemed so "intolerabl[e]" that the Supreme Court
eventually reversed itself.85
But why is Swift burdened with this doctrinal scarlet letter?86 If Swift
really "marked [no] sudden and dramatic change from prior practice, 87

77. In one, however, there are oracles of a sort. See infra Part It.
78. See Redish & Marshall, supra note 45, at 472.
79. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
80. 41 U.S. (Pet. 16) 1 (1842). See also TONY ALLAN FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE
SWIFT AND ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM chs. 11I-111 (1981).

81. 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1652 (1982)); cf. William Fletcher, The
General Common Law and Section 34 of the JudiciaryAct of1789: The Example of Marine Insurance,
97 HARV. L. REv. 1513 (1984) (arguing that Swift's decision was hardly as anomalous as generally
believed).
82. J. Harvie Wilkinson, Our StructuralConstitution, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1687, 1694 (2004).
83. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
84. Easterbrook, supranote 69, at 424.
85. Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to JudicialArchitecture: Modifying the Regional Design of
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 603, 639 (1989).
86. See NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (Oxford Univ. Press 1990) (1850).
87. See Fletcher, supra note 81, at 1513, 1515 ("[Llong before Swift, federal courts employed the
general common law as an important part of their working jurisprudence.").
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why is it so easy, to
borrow Judge Easterbrook's phrase, to "see the virtue
88
of abandoning" it?
This section attempts to answer these questions. To that end, subsection
A reviews some of the familiar critiques (both theoretical and functional)
of Swift. Subsection B then addresses Swift's oft-ignored but
constitutionally
problematic
decisionmaking methodology.
And
subsection C locates Swift's decisionmaking method within the broader
unconstitutional course thesis, briefly noting the ways in which Swift is
(and is not) a troubling decisional model.
A. Swift in Context
So why is it so easy to "see the virtue of abandoning" Swift, especially
in hindsight? Part of the reason is novelty. Rarely does the Court declare
one of its own decisions philosophically invalid.89 When the Court does
so-as Erie did to Swift-it typically causes quite a stir, 90 as well as a kind
of retrospective vilification. 9 1
Another part of the reason is jurisprudential theory. To many, Swift
represents the apotheosis of an utterly misguided conception of law, a
sophism of legal thought. 92 To these detractors, Swift's very name evokes
the long-discredited notion that the common law is a "self-sustaining body
of normative authority,
living through the articulations of the federal
93
judiciary alone.,

88. Easterbrook, supranote 69, at 424.
89. Cf.Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("Bowers v. Hardwick[, 478 U.S. 186
(1986),] should be and now is overruled."); Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) ("Any
language in Plessy v. Ferguson[, 163 U.S. 537 (1896),] contrary to this finding is rejected."). In
Lawrence, the Court makes explicit that "Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not
correct today." 539 U.S. at 578. The Erie Court makes no comparable statement about Swift, but a
similar point seems implicit in the Court's wholesale denunciation of Justice Story's opinion.
90. "The decision went unnoticed until Justice Stone wrote privately to Arthur Krock of the New
York Times calling to his attention 'the most important opinion since I have been on the court."'
STEVEN YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 224 (6th ed. 2004) (citations omitted).
91. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 69, at 424; see also FREYER, supra note 80, at chs. I-I1 and
2; Henry J. Friendly, In Praiseof Erie-andof the New FederalCommon Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383
(1964); see generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION:
ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA (2000).

92. See, e.g., Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 HARV. L. REV.
529, 545-46 (1951) ("The danger to be feared in this effort to revive the concept of natural law is that
it will lead us unconsciously back to the shop-worn absolutes of an earlier day."). Many others
disagree with this uncharitable conception of natural law. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHT (1980); DWORKIN, supra note 69, at 126, 149.
93. Lawrence Lessig, UnderstandingChanged Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV.
395, 428 (1994) (citation omitted).
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And part of the reason that Swift bears such a sullied mark is its longlasting-and troubling-effect on federal court decisionmaking. In the last
century, much has been written about Swift's philosophical deficits.94 In
slightly more recent times, a great deal has been written about the
paradigm-altering way Erie rejected Swift's jurisprudential logic. 95 Lost in
these important discussions, however, is a thoroughgoing examination of
something more mechanical, more concrete: the problematic
decisionmaking model that Swift erected and endorsed. This
decisionmaking model was-as Justice Brandeis unequivocally concludes
in Erie-itself unconstitutional.9 6 This decisionmaking model is also the
archetypal unconstitutional course.97
It is an archetype born in an unglamorous-even unremarkable 9 8setting. In a very narrow sense, Swift asked a pedestrian question about
New York banking law: How many defenses did a "bill of exchange"
carry?99 In a slightly broader (more formal) sense, Swift presented a
straightforward problem of lexicology: What does the word "laws" in the
Rules of Decision Act (RODA) 10 0 mean? Does the word "laws" denote
"rules and enactments promulgated by [state] legislature authority" and
"decisions of local tribunals"--that is, "common as well as statutory
law"-or does it signify statutory law alone?' 01
In an even broader (more jurisprudential) sense, of course, Swift
involved more than semantics. Folded into Swift's formal definitional
exercise is a weighty philosophical question about the source and meaning
of law generally: Does "positive," "obligatory"
law exist exclusive of a
10 2
sovereign source-i.e., is law made orfound?

94. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 69, at 424; Charles Warren, New Light on the History of
the FederalJudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49, 51-52, 81-88, 108 (1923); Alton B. Parker,
The Common Law Jurisdictionof the United States Courts, 17 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1907).
95. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84
VA. L. REv. 673 (1998).
96. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938).
97. Id. at 78; id. at 91 (Reed, J., concurring).
98. See Fletcher, supra note 81, at 1513.
99. Id. at 1514 ("[Swift is] a decision on the law of negotiable instruments concerning the
availability of defenses to a remote endorsee who had taken a bill of exchange in payment of
preexisting debt.").
100. Section 34 of the Rules of Decision Act provided that "[t]he laws of the several states, except
where the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall
be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States .... "Ch. 20,
§ 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652). According to Judge Fletcher, section 34
was an "afterthought" passed "without serious debate," Fletcher, supra note 81, at 1527, perhaps even
as a "temporary provision." Id. at 1562.
101. Lessig, supra note 93, at 427.
102. Id.
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To legal positivistsl 03-whose day on the Court was yet to come-the
answer to this philosophical question is plain: law is made, not found.
There is no pre-existing body of law for courts to find; to quote Justice
Holmes's famous maxim, there is "no brooding omnipresence in the
sky. '' l 04 All there is, Holmes assures, is "the articulate voice of some
sovereign,"' 0 5 whether legislative or judicial.
But to advocates of natural law-who held sway on the Swift
Court'° 6 -the answer is just as plain, though precisely the opposite: law
can indeed be found. An ethereal corpus of law does exist, just waiting to
be divined. 0 7 And since state courts can claim no priority regarding the
location and meaning of this "law"-no special faculty in divining this
"omnipresence"--there is no reason to treat state court decisions as law
binding on federal courts. Federal courts are, in the end, just as skilled at
surveying this body of "natural" law-at playing the role, in Lord
Blackstone's aphoristic phrase, of "living oracles.' 0 8 Federal courts may
even be better "oracles, 10 9 so it makes sense that federal courts should
find this law themselves." 0
Swift adopted this strongly naturalistic position."' Lead by Justice
Story, the Swift Court defined RODA's "laws" to include legislative

103. See generallyJEREMY BENTHAM, 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 233, 235 (J. Bowring
ed. 1840); JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED I & V (ist ed. 1832). For
two extended (and divergent) discussions of positivism generally, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 85-100 (1961), and DWORKIN, supranote 69, at 17-22.
104. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
105. Id. Justice Holmes's imagery grew from solid meteorological stock. See, e.g., P. Du
PONCEAU, A DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF
THE UNITED STATES 88 (1824) ("Like the sun under a cloud, it was overshadowed .... "). See also
Fletcher, supra note 81, at 1517 (calling Holmes's brand of positivism both "time- and culture-bound,"
a far cry from nineteenth century conceptions of "a general system of jurisprudence ... constantly
hovering over [I local legislation and filling up its interstices") (citations omitted).
106. See, e.g., 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 471-78 (1884); GERALD DUNNE,
JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT 406-08 (1970).
107. Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism: Restriking the Balance Between Judicial
Minimalism and Neutral Principles,90 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1766 (2004) (noting that a "natural law"
judge would not dictate particular outcomes in future cases, but "would simply articulate principles
that a subsequent judge inevitably would find on his own in the course of deciding a subsequent
case").
108. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES 69 (U. Chi. 1979); see also Dennis Nolan, Sir
William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 731 (1976).
109. Lessig, supra note 93, at 427-30.
110. Id.
111. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 17 (1842). Some keen observers have attempted to recast
Swift as a subtly pro-positivistic decision. See, e.g., WILLIAM CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1953). Clever as these attempts may seem,
however, they are surely more post hoc contrarianism than accurate description. See William Casto,
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proclamations-that is, "positive" statements from legislatures-and
nothing more. 11 2 To the Swift Court, state court decisions were mere
"pronouncements" by judges, judicial conclusions reached through what
Professor Lessig has called a process of "scientistic" adjudication-a
relatively orderly investigation of some overarching, intangible body of
"law."'" 3 Federal courts, Swift explained, need not accept these state-court
"pronouncements" as binding authority, even when the law to be "found"
involved a narrow question of state law. Indeed, since state courts possess
no special talent in this empirical law-finding enterprise, federal courts
may-perhaps mustl14- 'fi nd "general
"
federal common law" themselves.
Swift's extended denouement is well chronicled. In the near-century
after the decision, Swift came to represent the triumph of a specific
conception of common law, one in which state-court decisions were only
"evidence" of the law, not law itself. 1' 5 During this time, federal courts
developed "some twenty-eight areas of [federal] common law
jurisprudence.""16

As time passed, however, cracks in Swift's foundation started to
expand."7 Some of these cracks took practical (or structural) form. One
such crack exposed a serious separation-of-powers defect, a kind of
unsustainable judicial overreaching" 8 that permitted federal courts to
"declare federal law [even] on questions over which Congress could not

The Erie Doctrine And the Structure of ConstitutionalRevolutions, 62 TUL. L. REV. 907, 918 (1988)
(calling these efforts "anachronistic"). A tighter reconceptualization of Swift comes from Professor
Horwitz, who has argued that Justice Story's decision was something of a stalking horse-a less than
"serious[]" manipulation of "orthodox legal theory" intended to advance commercialism. MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, 245-50 (1977). Perhaps a deep
pro-entrepreneurial spirit did motivate Justice Story; perhaps Swift really was a nod to business in the
guise of natural law. But Swift has always represented something different, viz., a pinnacle of
naturalistic legal reasoning.
112. See Lessig, supra note 93, at 427 (exploring the roots of Justice Story's decision to read
"laws" narrowly).
113. Id. In this sense, Professor Lessig explains, Swift is a triumph of "Baconian empiricism," a
system in which "[s]cience became the premise for common law studies ....Law was, in this view, a
science, where jurists, like scientists, were seeking truth, and where this search for juristic truth could
be separated from political ends." Lessig, supra note 93, at 428-30 ("We are likely to resist this
description of jurists of the nineteenth century, in part because we misunderstand what they meant by
'science."').
114. Under Swift, federal courts may even be required"to express [their] own opinion[s] of the
true result of the [] law upon the [presented] question[s]." 41 U.S. at 19.
115. Id. at 18-19.
116. Lessig, supra note 93, at 426.
117. Id.at430.
118. Professor Strauss has called this an over-extended "privilege of federal courts." Strauss,
supranote 6, at 913.
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legislate."' 19 Another such crack revealed a deep federalism flaw, a kind of
unsustainable federal overreaching that
permitted a federal institution to
1 20
legislatures.
state
of
power
the
exercise
As these more practical cracks widened, Swift's philosophical deficits
began to emerge as well. With Swift's conception of common law came an
entirely
contestable-and
increasingly
contested 21-naturalistic
jurisprudential philosophy, a belief in some "brooding omnipresence in the
sky." 122 In the near-century following Swift, this philosophy
drew ever123
increasing fire-not least from some members of the Court.
Erie struck the decisive (judicial) blow in this contest. In Erie, Swift's
supposed philosophical "fallacy" was exposed, its specious dependence on
a "transcendental body of law outside any particular State but obligatory
within it" undercut. 124 To the Erie Court, Swift's interpretation of the word
"laws" was worse than wrong; it was itself unconstitutional-not "because
the federal common law rules that had been developed under it were
encroaching on areas of 'state substantive law' or 'state law governing
primary private activity,"", 125 but because "nothing in the Constitution
provided the central government with a general lawmaking authority of the
sort" Swift condoned. 126 As the Erie Court understood it, Swift's very
existence depended on a profound misconception of the way law is spoken
and understood. 127 Only by fundamentally "transform[ing]" this invalid
discourse, 128 Erie concluded, could the Court's path be set aright.
B. Swift's Course
For good reason, this exceptional shift in jurisprudential philosophy has
attracted a great deal of academic attention. The triumph of a Holmesian
type of legal positivism, 129 the scaling back of the judiciary's "prescriptive

119. Id. at 912-13; see also Wilkinson, supra note 82, at 1694.
120. See Lessig, supra note 93, at 431.
121. Id.
122. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
123. See, e.g., id.
124. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (noting that this law could be "changed
by statute") (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
125. See Ely, supra note 16, at 702-04 ("[lI]t is on precisely those areas that new federal domestic
legislation inevitably encroaches.").
126. Id. at 703.
127. See Lessig, supra note 93, at 432 ("One discourse died, and another replaced it, and it is from
this contestation in the discourse about law that Erie got its sanction.") (citation omitted).
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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power,"' 30 the power of Erie's federalist theme,' 31 the pattern of doctrinal
change that Erie represents132-all have prompted detailed review.
But Erie did more than signal a shift in dominant legal philosophy, a
repudiation of Swift's conception of "law." Erie denounced Swift's method
(or means) of judicial decisionmaking; it condemned, that is, the
impermissible analytical procedure-the "unconstitutional course"-that
Swift's naturalism condoned. 133 Put in more abstract terms,
Erie rejected
134
the why of Swift, and it rejected the what of Swift as well.
To give content to this why-and-what notion, it is helpful to consider
how an inferior federal court would decide a case using Swift's decisional
model. In generic terms, Swift's decisionmaking system proceeds in two
steps: The federal court must first determine if any germane, Swiftrecognized "positive" law-that is, statutory law-guides resolution of the
relevant question. If there is applicable statutory direction, the federal
court must abide that law as "obligatory."'' 35 But if there is no applicable
legislative pronouncement, the court may thenfind its own law, looking to
a body of "transcendental" law for instruction-and consulting analogous
state-court common law only as the federal court sees fit.
A slight twist on Swift's facts offers a specific illustration of this
(unconstitutional) two-step decisionmaking process. In this fictional
example, the question before the federal court is how many defenses a
"bill of exchange" carries-this time under New Jersey law. 3 6 Like New
York (in 1841, at least), New Jersey lacks a statutory index of the relevant
defenses, so, under Swift, there is no "obligatory," "positive" law to direct
the court's analysis. As it happens, New Jersey's courts have already
answered this precise question, exhaustively cataloguing the defenses
available. But this state-court common law is, under Swift, of little
moment. Such decisions are "at most evidence of what the laws are"; they
are "not themselves laws."'137 It falls to the federal court, then, to determine
for itself how many defenses exist-i.e., to "find" the answer by

130. Wilkinson, supra note 82, at 1694.
131. See Strauss, supra note 6, at 913.
132. See Lessig, supra note 93, at 432-33.
133. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78, 91.
134. See Lawson, supra note 11, at 210 ("One cannot decide cases without bringing to bear some
decision-making methodology ... .
135. Swift, 41 U.S. at 17.
136. See id. The analogy is to Swift itself.
137. Id. at 18-19 ("Undoubtedly, the decisions of the local tribunals upon such subjects are
entitled to, and will receive, the most deliberate attention and respect of this court .... ").
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consulting some "transcendental
body of law outside any particular State
'1 38
but obligatory within it."
In the end, the federal court may "find" ten defenses; it may find five.
The court's decision may comport with existing state common law; it may
not. The outcome may appear objectively correct on the facts; it may not.
What the particular outcome is, however, is not the essence of the
constitutional problem. The source of the constitutional problem is how
the federal court made its decision: how that decisionmaking process
involved an untenable aggrandizement of federal power, how it depended
on an untenable aggrandizement of judicial power, how it relied on an
ephemeral "brooding omnipresence," and how it overemphasized empiric
and scientistic adjudication. 139 These how problems do more than raise
concerns of form and theory. They turn Swift's decisionmaking process
into an inherently unconstitutional enterprise, placing all Swift-abiding
federal courts on an unconstitutional decisionmaking "course."
C. Swift's Dangers
It bears emphasis that nothing about Swift's decisionmaking "course"
guarantees
federal
courts
will
reach
incorrect-let
alone
unconstitutional-substantive outcomes. In some contexts, Swift-following
federal courts will "find" "correct" substantive results; in some contexts,
these courts will even reach conclusions consistent with state common
law, partially ameliorating Swift's significant federalism tension.
But even these "correct" and "consistent" decisions are constitutionally
infirm because of the decisionmaking method used to achieve them. By
attempting to "find" law, by consulting a "brooding omnipresence," by
overextending both federal and judicial power, the federal court follows
an unconstitutional decisional course-no matter what outcome the court
reaches.
It likewise bears emphasis that this is a constitutional problem of the
Court's own creation. In the abstract, the idea of Court-created
unconstitutionality may seem-and may actually be-unexceptional.
Every so often, the Court will change its interpretation of the Constitution,
sometimes in ways that puzzle even the most meticulous of "fidelity"

138. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276
U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
139. This adjudicative approach had plenty of other (sometimes more superficial) problems: It
risked unnecessary inconsistency between state and federal courts within the same state, and it
encouraged a rather cynical type of forum shopping. See id. at 533.
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theorists. 140 These interpretive shifts occasionally require the Court to
refute (or to undo entirely) existing precedent. As this happens, prior Court
interpretations of the Constitution are refrained as themselves
142
14 1
deemed Plessy v. Ferguson
unconstitutional: Brown v. Board
invalid; Lawrence v. Texas 14 3 did the same to Bowers v.
constitutionally
44
1
Hardwick.
In significant ways, Plessy, Bowers, and Swift are birds of an
unconstitutional feather. Each signifies a particular type of Court-made
unconstitutionality-a particular type of "intolerabl[y]" "bad" law.' 45 Each
suffered reversal by subsequent Supreme Court doctrine.
But Swift is not a perfect partner to Plessy and Bowers. Swift's
constitutional invalidity has a different resonance, a different scope than
Plessy's and Bowers'. Where Plessy and Bowers announce dubious (and
later rejected) interpretations of substantive law, Swift erects an
unconstitutional decisionmaking apparatus. Where Plessy and Bowers
(mis)construe specific portions of the Constitution, Swift allows federal
courts to develop an entirely new (and relatively unconstrained) body of
common law. And where Plessy and Bowers put inferior federal courts in
the typical (if sometimes uncomfortable) position of adhering to stare
decisis, Swift puts inferior federal courts in the remarkable position of
making decisions according to an impermissible procedural frameworki.e., according to an unconstitutional course.
Rare as these unconstitutional courses may be, Swift demonstrates that
they do, on occasion, develop. For some of these courses, the remedy is
obvious and (perhaps) inevitable, the damage wrought more theoretical
than real. 146 For other courses, however, the remedy is neither obvious nor
easy, the damage neither abstract nor trivial. Swift's unconstitutional
course may well fit safely in the first category. Williams v. Taylor's
unconstitutional course seems to fit just as securely in the second.

140. See generally Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247
(1997); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation,71 TEX. L. REv. 1165 (1993).
141. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
142. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
143. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
144. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
145. Meador, supra note 85, at 639.
146. Erie unraveled Swift's "unconstitutional course." But even if the Court had refused to selfcorrect, Swift's course could have been easily righted. Congress, for one, could have modified RODA.
State legislatures, for another, could have made more "positive" law. This latter option, to be sure,
elides many of Swift's fundamental problems, but it did exist as a "fix" of sorts, however limited it
might have been.
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III. A MODERN TURN: WILLIAMS' UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURSE

In many ways, Williams is a modem-day Swift. Like Swift, Williams
grows from deep historical roots. 147 Like Swift, Williams raises serious
pragmatic and philosophical questions-about vague constitutional
1 50
149
provisions 48 and cryptic statutory law, about recondite Court doctrine
and federal court power. 151 And like Swift, Williams prescribes a specific
decisionmaking procedure.
But Swift and Williams are far from a matched set. They address very
different substantive legal questions. They make largely irreconcilable
contributions to the federalism debate.152 They invest federal courts with
very different levels of decisional latitude. And they announce very
different kinds of unconstitutional courses, Williams' version proving far
more pernicious than its predecessor.
This section takes an extended look at Williams' unconstitutional
course. Subsection A begins with a brief review of modem habeas corpus
law, focusing in particular on the broader jurisprudential questions
informing much of the habeas debate. Subsection B then situates this longrunning debate within contemporary doctrine, examining the Court's
interpretation of the AEDPA-and the Act's state-review provision in
particular. In support of this discussion, subsection C highlights a few of
the more salient flaws in Williams' AEDPA analysis. Subsection D
follows with a detailed consideration of a particularly subtle but
particularly important flaw, viz., Williams' prescription of an
unconstitutional course.
A. Williams' Context: Habeas Corpus
Federal habeas review of state court decisions is a peculiar project. At
once foreign and familiar, habeas seems to have a bit of everything,

147. See Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2331, 2337 (1993)
[hereinafter Yackle, Hagioscope].
148. Compare Erie's cryptic constitutionalism, 304 U.S. at 78, with the Suspension Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl.2.
149. See, e.g., Yackle, Hagioscope,supra note 147, at 2431.
150. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989);
Butler v. MeKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992); Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
151. See, e.g., Cole, supra notc 19, at 2481.
152. Swift inserted federal courts into an area of state law; Williams shields state-court errors of
federal law.
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"open[ing] a window on the workings of our national government."'' 53 For
this reason, habeas has been the source of serious debates-or, to borrow
Professor Yackle's more vigorous metaphor, pitched "ideological"
"battle[s]"1 54-for decades. 155 Should habeas review upset typical rules of
preclusion and deference? Is federal habeas review of state-court decisions
irreconcilably inconsistent with federalism?1 56 Does federal habeas review
depend on an epistemological myth, a fiction that excuses potentially
"endless" strings of collateral litigation because some "possibility of
quite durable in
mistake always exists"?157 The questions are myriad-and
' 58
the "long and distinguished" history of the "Great Writ."
Over time, the responses to these questions have grown just as
commonplace, if not altogether ossified.1 59 To its staunchest critics, federal
habeas review of state court decisions is (and has always been) a blatant
affront to state autonomy. Habeas review, the critics observe, makes a
state institution unnecessarily subordinate to a federal one, superimposing
an inferior federal court as a kind of state appellate tribunal.160 At most,
these critics contend, federal habeas review should ensure that state courts
abide baseline jurisdictional and process-based guarantees-what Justice
Pitney once termed "established modes of procedure." 161 It should not

153. Yackle, Hagioscope,supra note 147, at 2331.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Dallin Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States 1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 243
(1965); Dallin Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-HabeasCorpus, 64 MICH. L. REv. 451 (1966);
Scheidegger, supra note 38, at 928-33.
156. Federal habeas corpus has always confronted a kind of paradox. On the one hand, habeas
corpus exists to allow prisoners to challenge-i.e., to "appeal"--putatively incorrect decisions of law,
often those made by state courts. Yackle, supra note 35, at 409 (citation omitted). On the other hand,
habeas is an extraordinary judicial remedy, not an opportunity to "relitigate [all] state trials." Id. at
411.
157. Paul M. Bator, Finality in CriminalLaw and FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners,76
HARV. L. REV. 441,447 (1963).
158. Yackle, Hagioscope, supranote 147, at 2337.
159. Id. at 2431 (noting that the debate is "charged by ideological differences that have changed
very little over the years").
160. Id. at 2333.
161. See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 326 (1915). Since 1867, this process-based limit has
been difficult to defend. Like the Acts that followed it, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, Act of Feb. 5,
1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (amending Act of May 11, 1866, ch. 80, 14 Stat. 46), imposes no process
limit and announces no exception for particular types of state-court decisions. Yackle, Hagioscope,
supra note 147, at 2338; see Gary Peller, In Defense of FederalHabeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 579, 690-91 (1982) ("[U]ntil Stone v. Powell, the habeas statute consistently had
been interpreted to provide federal habeas review for all constitutional claims regardless of the extent
of prior state court litigation."). So, however valid this process, or jurisdiction-based limit might have
been, it no longer holds much jurisprudential water. See Jordan Steiker, Incorporatingthe Suspension
Clause: Is There a ConstitutionalRight to FederalHabeas Corpus for State Prisoners?,92 MICH. L.
REv. 862, 881 (1994) ("[lIt is simply wrong to assert that the writ known to the framers of the
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open the door to federal reconsideration of every manner of constitutional
the federal
claim,162 for universal habeas review would only "bur[y]"
63
petitions.1
habeas
meritless)
(often
of
flood"
a
courts "in
Advocates of more vigorous habeas review have long struggled to
rebut the critics' claims-not least because the critics are, in some ways,
quite right: federal habeas review of state-court decisions does imply a
federal distrust of state power, often quite plainly. 164 Federal habeas
review does smack of appellate review, contradicting ordinary preclusion
doctrine and basic full faith and credit ideas. 165 And federal habeas review
does raise epistemological questions about "correct" conclusions and
"actual" right answers 166-as well as practical concerns about meritorious
67
substantive "needles" being lost in a "haystack" of "worthless" ones.'
But advocates of more expansive habeas review do have a powerful
argument to make, one with solid theoretical and historical roots.1 68 To
these habeas advocates, federal habeas review does more than ensure that
the state court's jurisdiction was valid-that it "act[ed]" properly "as a
16 9
Habeas allows federal courts to rectify state-court errors of
court."'
federal constitutional law (process-based or not) 170 and to vindicate federal
1
as enforcers of some type of thinly veiled anti-federalism,
rights 7'-not
but as guardians of a healthy federalist balance, as shepherds of
recalcitrant states, and as holders of "the final say" (in Justice
Fourteenth Amendment was the same narrowly circumscribed writ known at English common law, or
perhaps even known to the framers of the Suspension Clause."); id. at 888 (noting that the
"transformation" of the writ between 1789 and 1868 "strongly supports the writ's role in protection

national rights in a national forum"); see also Woolhandler, supranote 30, at 630.
162.
163.

Cole, supra note 19, at 2489.
See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953)

(Jackson, J., concurring); see also

Scheidegger, supra note 38, at 940 (calling "federal habeas for state prisoners... an exercise in judgeshopping").

164. See, e.g., Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 147, at 2339 (discussing the "friction" caused by
"plenary federal jurisdiction").
165. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000); see also Yackle, supra note 35, at 401; Tsen Lee,
supra note 31, at 106-07.
166. Bator, supra note 157, at 446-47.

167. Brown, 344 U.S. at 537 (Jackson, J., concurring).
168.

See, e.g., Steiker, supra note 161, at 881, 888.

169. Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 147, at 2340, 2346 (deeming a narrow understanding of due
process "primitive").
170. Id. at 2345-46 (noting that, to Professor Bator, direct review and collateral review were not
identical, for Professor Bator treated "due process" as "one thing on direct review of a state court
judgment and another in habeas corpus") (citation omitted).
171.

See Steiker, supra note 161, at 881,888.
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Frankfurter's words) on questions
offederal law172-- even at the price of a
73
claims.
empty
of
"haystack"
For part of the last half-century, the Supreme Court subscribed to this
catholic conception of habeas' role. In Brown v. Allen, 174 the Court set an
175
unmistakable path of expanding and intensifying federal habeas review.
The Warren Court readily followed Brown's lead, assuring that federal
courts had a central role to play in the adjudication of federal
constitutional questions-including those questions already decided by
state courts.1 76 In three post-Brown cases-a group pithily labeled "[t]he
great trilogy of habeas corpus decisions" 77-the Warren Court specified
how federal district courts should conduct their habeas work, 78 how these
courts should manage multiple petitions from a single petitioner, 79 and
how petitioners should navigate habeas' often recondite procedural
maze. 180 All four of these decisions envisioned ' a8 broad and powerful writ
of habeas, an almost "omnipotent writ of error."' '
And all four prompted a healthy measure of criticism. Some of this
criticism came from the academy. 82 Some came, in time, from the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts.' 83 And some came from more overtly political
sources, committees intent on revamping federal habeas law. 184 A few of
these political efforts garnered considerable support, but nearly all failed

172. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 774.
173. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Yackle,
Hagioscope,supra note 147, at 2342.
174. 344 U.S. at443.
175. Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 147, at 2349 (arguing that the Warren Court treated the writ
of habeas corpus as the "procedural analogue of its substantive interpretations of the Constitutionproviding federal machinery for bringing new constitutional values to bear in concrete cases.").
176. Id. at 2343; see also Todd E. Pettys, Federal Habeas Relief and the New Tolerance for
"Reasonably Erroneous" Applications of FederalLaw, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 740-41 (2002).
177. Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 147, at 2347.
178. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
179. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
180. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
181. Roger Berkowitz, Error-Centricity,Habeas Corpus, and the Rule of Law as the Law of
Rulings, L.A. L. REV. 477, 482 (2004). See also Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
DialecticalFederalism:Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977).
182. Professor Bator, for example, called for a return of a narrow process limit and a rejection of
habeas-created redundancy. Bator, supra note 157, at 446.
183. This criticism came primarily in the form of gradual retreats from thoroughgoing habeas
review. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supranote 181, at 1045.
184. As Kent Scheidegger has noted, Congress has come "tantalizingly close to abrogating the
Brown rule" many times. Scheidegger, supra note 38, at 890. The Powell Commission was perhaps the
most prominent of these committees. For a full text of the Powell Commission's report, see 45 THE
CRIMINAL LAW REPORTER 3239 (1989).
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to produce much (if any) change
in the way federal courts reviewed habeas
185
petitions from state prisoners.
Until 1996, that is. In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act.186 An elaborate' 87 and expansive effort,
AEDPA alters much of the preexisting habeas paradigm: One AEDPA
section establishes new exhaustion rules; another erects more rigorous
standards for successive petitions; one section sets a less-generous statute
of limitations;
still another truncates the review process in certain capital
88
cases. 1

And one AEDPA provision addresses how federal courts review the
merits of state court decisions. This state-court-review provisionAEDPA's section 2254(d)--has proven one of the Act's most prominent
features. It has also presented AEDPA's deepest "interpretational
problem[].' 8 9 Section 2254(d) reads:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits
in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.' 90
At first blush, section 2254(d) appears to do very little work.' 9' It
seems merely to posit a set of standards of review, defining the manner 19in
2
which federal courts assess the merits of particular state court decisions.
It does not, on its face, seem to undercut the power of federal courts to
review the substance of state court decisions of federal law; 193 nor does it

185. Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 147, at 2349-73.
186. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104(3), 110 Stat. 1214, 1219 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
(Supp. 11 1996)).
187. See Yackle, supra note 35, at 381 ("The result.., is extraordinarily arcane verbiage .....
188. Id.; see also Tsen Lee, supra note 31, at 104 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254, & 2261-66).
189. Tsen Lee, supra note 31, at 104.
190. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000).
191. For those that watch habeas law closely, of course, the very numbering of section 2254(d)
draws attention. See Tsen Lee, supra note 31, at 107.
192. Id.
193. This is no small thing. Whether courts may review is itself an important question-and not
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seem to undo habeas' noteworthy-if formally dubious-exemptions from
ordinary preclusion doctrine and the full faith and credit statute.' 94
But section 2254(d) does seem to hint at something significant-as
195
habeas scholars and inferior federal courts noted almost immediately.
Between 1996 and 2000, these observers labored to find section 2254(d)'s
core. If section 2254(d) establishes a more deferential standard of review,
both for questions of law and for mixed questions of law and fact;' 96 how
much (if at all) section 2254(d) raises the bar against granting habeas
remedies;' 97 whether section 2254(d) conflicts with Article III's central
judicial vision' 98-- courts and scholars engaged each of these questions,
often quite comprehensively. 199
Not until 2000, however, did the Supreme Court take a clear (if
fractured) position on the meaning200and effect of section 2254(d). It took
that position in Williams v. Taylor.
B. Williams and the Court
Like so many habeas cases, Williams tells a cheerless and protracted
story. The story's legal chapter begins in 1986, when a Virginia state jury
convicted Terry Williams of robbery and capital murder. 20 ' At the
sentencing hearing that followed, the prosecution introduced evidence of a
litany of Mr. Williams' prior offenses.2 °2 In response, Mr. Williams'
counsel offered only a modicum of evidence, devoting most of his energy
to "explaining that it was difficult to find a reason why the jury should
spare Williams' life. 20 3 The jury found no such reason; instead, it found

one with easy answers in every case. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289
(2001) (though it is not impacted by the text of section 2254(d)).
194. Yackle, supra note 35, at 401-02.
195. See, e.g., id.; Scheidegger, supra note 38, at 890 (noting that AEDPA "touched off a mad
scramble"); Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352, 357-62 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1004
(1999).
196. See, e.g., Perez v. Marshall, 946 F. Supp. 1521, 1533 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
197. See, e.g., Scheidegger, supra note 38, at 891 ("Congress has plenary authority to determine
the degree to which a state court's judgment will preclude relitigation of the question . .. including [in]
habeas corpus. Congress could prescribe total preclusion, de novo relitigation, or a middle ground.").
198. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 864-84.
199. Id.
200. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
201. Id. at 368.
202. Id. at 368-69 (noting that many of these prior offenses were violent).
203. Id. at 369 ("The evidence offered by Williams' trial counsel at the sentencing hearing
consisted of the testimony of Williams' mother, two neighbors, and a taped excerpt from a statement
by a psychiatrist."). In his opinion in Williams, Justice Stevens quotes defense counsel at length:
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"a probability of future dangerousness" and "unanimously fixed Williams'
punishment at death. '' 20 4 The trial court deemed the sentence "proper" and
"just."2 °5 The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed-both
on direct review
20 6
and on review of a petition for state collateral relief.
In 1997, Mr. Williams filed a petition for federal habeas relief under
section 2254.207 In his petition, Mr. Williams asserted, as he had in the
state courts, that he had been deprived of effective assistance of counsel.
The federal district court agreed, and it granted Mr. Williams' petition
accordingly. 20 8 The Fourth Circuit reversed, 20 9 but the Supreme Court
reinstated the district court's conclusion, 2 '0 awarding Mr. Williams a rare
victory on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.2 '
But Mr. Williams' victory was also a Pyrrhic one, at least for future
habeas petitioners.
In Williams, the Court elaborates an entirely "new constraint,' 21 2 a new
(and severe) limit on federal habeas courts' "ability to review state court
applications of law to fact. ' ,2 13 This new limit derives, Williams contends,
from section 2254(d) itself-the section's "contrary to" and "unreasonable
application" clauses in particular. 1 4 These two clauses, Williams explains,
have distinct meaning: To fit the "contrary to" standard, a state court
decision must either follow the wrong rule or misread the facts
blatantly. 2 5 To satisfy the "unreasonable application" standard, by

I will admit too that it is very difficult to ask you to show mercy to a man who maybe has not
shown much mercy himself. Idoubt very seriously that he thought much about mercy when
he was in Mr. Stone's bedroom that night with him. Idoubt very seriously that he had mercy
very highly on his mind when he was walking along West Green and the incident with
Alberta Stroud. I doubt very seriously that he had mercy on his mind when he took two cars
that didn't belong to him. Admittedly it is very difficult to get us and ask that you give this
man mercy when he has shown so little of it himself. But I would ask that you would.
Id. at n.2.
204. Id. at 370.
205. Id.
206. Williams, 529 U.S. at 370.
207. This timing is significant. Since Mr. Williams filed his petition in 1997, his case is governed
by AEDPA, not by "the pre-1996 version of the federal habeas statute." Id. at 364.
208. Id. at 372-74.
209. Williams v. Taylor, 163 F.3d 860 (4th Cir. 1998).
210. 529 U.S. at 374.
211. Id. In the sixteen years after Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court found
no instance of inadequate representation. Cf.William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn:
Doctrinaland PracticalUnderminingof the Right to Counsel,4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91 (1995).
212. Williams, 529 U.S. 411-13 (O'Connor, J.); cf id. at 386 (arguing that section 2254(d) merely
evinced a 'mood' that the Federal Judiciary must respect") (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
213. Pettys, supra note 176, at 749.
214. Williams, 529 U.S. at 404.
215. The state court, that is, must apply "a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the
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contrast, a state court decision need not follow the wrong governing
rule; 2 16
the state court need only apply that rule "unreasonably to the
2 17
facts.,

What "unreasonable" means, of course, is far from clear-as the
Williams Court readily acknowledges. 218 But what is clear, the Court
assures, is what "unreasonable" does not mean: "[A]n unreasonable
application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of
federal law., 219 Had Congress meant "erroneous" or "incorrect," Williams
concludes, Congress would have said so. But Congress made a careful
lexical decision not to say "erroneous" or "incorrect"--and to say
"unreasonable" instead. With this semantic choice, the Court suggests,
Congress instructed federal courts not to issue "the writ simply because [a]
court concludes ... that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly
established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. 22 ° Wrong is not
enough. To issue the writ under section 2254(d)'s "unreasonable
application" clause, a state court decision must be wrong and
unreasonable; i.e., it must be unreasonably wrong. 22'
C. A Selection of Knots
There is something enticing about Williams' "unreasonably wrong"
standard. 2 Judged by even the most forgiving measure,2 23 habeas doctrine

Court's] cases," or it must "arrive[] at a result different from [Court] precedent" on a "set of facts that
are materially indistinguishable from a decision" of the Court. Id. at 405-06. Under section 2254(d),
the only relevant law is the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of th[e] Court's decisions as of the time
of the relevant state-court decision." Id. at 412.
216. Id. at 408-09.
217. Id. at 407-08. Williams also noted that a state-court decision may be deemed "unreasonable"
if it "unreasonably extend[s] a legal principle from [the Court's] precedent to a new context where it
should not apply (or unreasonably refuse[s] to extend a legal principle to a new context where it should
apply) ... " Id.; see also Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156 (2000).
218. Williams, 529 U.S. 411-12. "[T]he term 'unreasonable' is no doubt difficult to define." Id. at
410.
219. Id. at 412 (emphasis removed).
220. Id. at 411.
221. This wrangling over the meaning of "unreasonable" may seem, at first glance, to be much
ado about nothing: A straightforward application of the "contrary to" prong would seem to allow
federal habeas courts to rectify incorrect state-court decisions; an incorrect decision is, after all,
"contrary to" "the governing law set forth in [the Court's] cases." Id. at 405-06. But Williams refused
to read "contrary to" in this seemingly obvious way. Instead, the Court narrowed the reach of the
"contrary to" prong to cases in which state courts apply the wrong legal rule altogether or elide a
precise fact analog. Id. In this way, the ostensibly clear connection between "incorrect" and "contrary
to" is erased.
222. The shelter of reasonableness is always alluring. At the very least, it seems the best-and
most realizable-way to "achieve, on average, a socially tolerable level of accuracy in the application
of law to fact." Fallon, supra note 23, at 311. For this reason, courts have used the language of
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has long been muddled-if not positively "Byzantine and
unfathomable. 22 4 The Court's "unreasonably wrong" test seems, at first
glance, to offer a promising response to a large part of that confusion.
But Williams' "unreasonably wrong" standard is a cure substantially
worse than the disease. Far from resolving any of habeas' age-old riddles,
Williams complicates them, adding a number of new knots to an alreadytangled doctrine.22 5
One of Williams' new knots is its inadequate direction to lower courts.
Williams may posit a novel "reasonableness" "constraint"; it may even
describe what "unreasonable" does not mean.2 26 But there is little useful
guidance in Williams' negative definitions. In Williams, in fact, there is no
"specific guidance" at all regarding "how [courts] should distinguish
between reasonable and unreasonable [constitutional] errors.''227 There is
courts make that difficult-and
only a (tacit) demand that inferior federal
228
themselves.
crucial---determination
"reasonableness" liberally, nowhere more prominently than in the qualified immunity context. See,
e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985). Scholars, in
turn, have posited this "reasonableness standard" as a cure to functional constitutional problems. See,
e.g., Kamin, supra note 57, at 7.
But "reasonableness" is no panacea. It often leaves courts in the position of under-enforcing
constitutional rights-not because no constitutional violation occurred, but because the error was
somehow unobjectionable. In taking its seemingly unobjectionable "reasonableness" step, in fact,
Williams moves the courts from enforcing rights vigorously to enforcing very little at all. See Meltzer,
supranote 32, at 2522 ("The reductio ad absurdum would be this: when habeas courts grant relief they
are disagreeing with the state courts that upheld the conviction; when there is such disagreement,
either position is presumptively reasonable; hence, every habeas petitioner necessarily ... cannot
obtain relief .... ).
223. Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court's Habeas Reform, 83 CAL. L. REV.
485, 487 (1995) (measuring the Court's habeas reform effort "by its own terms," not "against an
independent normative perspective").
224. Id. at 486.
225. Some have gone so far as to describe the Williams' fallout as an "intellectual disaster area."
Larry W. Yackle, The Figure in the Carpet, 78 TEx. L. REv. 1731, 1756 (2000). It is worth noting,
too, that a host of (often labyrinthine) doctrinal mazes have developed in the habeas context, many in
an effort to ameliorate AEDPA's draconian flavor. See, e.g., Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002)
(discussing, inter alia,the meaning of "pending").
226. Williams, 529 U.S. at 404. At first blush, this exegesis seems faithful to section 2254(d)'s
text. Indeed, if Congress wanted a simple error-based standard, it could have said as much in the text
of the statute. But this textualist argument only goes so far. Even if the text is our sole interpretive
guide, the Court's gloss is still dubious. To reach Williams' end, one must presume that an incorrect
decision is not "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court doctrine. Cf. The Supreme Court, 1999
Term-Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REv. 179, 321-22 (2000).
227. Pettys, supra note 176, at 755 (citation omitted).
228. Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156 (2000), announced only three weeks after Williams,
leaves all of these methodological and etymological questions open.
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Another of Williams' knots is its curious theoretical pose, the Court's
strange blend of two notions of legal indeterminacy. 2 9 In part, Williams
implicitly disavows "the deterministic objectivism of formalism" 23°-the
claim that all legal questions have a "right" answer 23 1 and that this "right"
answer can be discovered through Herculean feats of deductive
reasoning. 232 At the same time, Williams implicitly rejects the
"indeterministic subjectivism of radical skepticism" 233-the claim that
legal questions have no objectively "correct" answers and that reasonable
jurists will resolve difficult questions in radically different ways.234
Somewhere between these two poles, Williams seems to suggest, sits a
middle theory of indeterminacy, a perfect balance of "objectivism" and
"subjectivism." But Williams takes this intriguing suggestion nowhere; it
offers no coherent theory of adjudication, no way to define that supposed
balance.235 Instead, the Court asks a tautological question:
"whether a state
236
court's application was objectively unreasonable.,
As Williams presents it, of course, this "objectively unreasonable"
question is simply what Congress intended.2 37 If it is a tautology, the Court
hints, it is one that the legislative history of section 2254(d) compels.

229. Professor Pettys contends-rather convincingly-that the Court rejects both in Williams. See
Pettys, supra note 176, at 776.
230. See id. at 776-79.
231. See DWORKIN,supra note 69, at 106; see also RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
pt. 5 (1985) [hereinafter DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE].
232. Id.
233. See Pettys, supra note 176, at 734; see also id. at 779-85 (proposing a thoughtful, moderate
version of "conventionalism" as a prospective theory of adjudication but conceding that a
conventionalist approach provides scant guidance in "hard cases").
234. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1685 (1976).
235. Not surprisingly, federal courts have struggled to fashion a workable solution to this riddle.
See, e.g., Neal v. Puckett, 239 F.3d 683, 695 (5th Cir. 2001), reh'g granted, 264 F.3d 1149 (5th Cir.
2001); Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing Williams), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 944 (2000); Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 109 n.12 (2d Cir. 2000).
236. Lainfiesta v. Artuz, 253 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2001).
237. In a short footnote, Williams contends that:
The legislative history of § 2254(d)(1) also supports this interpretation. See, e.g., 142 Cong.
Rec. 7799 (1996) (remarks of Sen. Specter) ("[U]nder the bill deference will be owed to State
courts' decisions on the application of Federal law to the facts. Unless it is unreasonable, a
State court's decision applying the law to the facts will be upheld"); 141 Cong. Rec. 14666
(1995) (remarks of Sen. Hatch) ("[W]e allow a Federal court to overturn a State court
decision only if it is contrary to clearly established Federal law or if it involves an
'unreasonable application' of clearly established Federal law to the facts").
Williams, 529 U.S. at 408 n.*. Senator Hatch's remarks are hardly illuminating; they simply emphasize
the text and disjunctive nature of section 2254(d)'s text. Senator Specter's remarks seem, at first blush,
more supportive of Williams' position, but even this quote says less than it may seem. All Senator
Specter denotes is "the application of Federal law to the facts." He says nothing about the "contrary
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But this reference to congressional motive is just another of Williams'
analytical knots. Congress's intent is hardly as obvious as Williams
casually suggests. 2 38 The Court may do less, in the end, to implement a
congressional plan faithfully than to subvert that plan, tipping a
"compromise solution ' 239 heavily one way.
Very little of this legislative "solution" need-or should-be revisited
here. Some of habeas' best scholars have already provided thoughtful,
exhaustive accounts of section 2254(d)'s tortuous legislative path. 240 Still,
two of that path's most significant turns merit brief consideration, if only
to give context to the Court's (mis)interpretation of section 2254(d) in
Williams.
The first turn came in the House of Representatives. In 1995, the House
considered a proposal that would permit federal courts to grant habeas
relief only where a state court decision was somehow "arbitrary or
unreasonable"--whether in the interpretation of Supreme Court law or in
the application of law to facts. 241 The use of the word "arbitrary" troubled
many in the House 242 -so much so that, to secure passage of the bill, the
proposal's sponsor excised the word. Under the bill passed by the House,

to" prong of section 2554(d), and he says nothing about ratifying constitutional error. Some of his
colleagues in the Senate were careful to do just the opposite. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. 7792 (daily ed.
Apr. 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Levin) ("I believe the courts will conclude, as they should, that a
constitutional error cannot be reasonable and that if a State court decision is wrong, it must necessarily
be unreasonable."). But cf Tsen Lee, supra note 31, at 112.
238. Of course, it never is. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 10, at 136-42.
239. Yackle, supranote 35, at 422.
240. See, e.g., Yackle, supra note 35; Tsen Lee, supra note 31; Meltzer, supra note 32; Liebman
& Ryan, supra note 15, at 871-72; Scheidegger, supra note 38.
241. Representative Christopher Cox brought a new-though not entirely novel, see Yackle, supra
note 35, at 432-34 (discussing the similarly-worded "Hyde Amendment")--proposal for habeas
reform. As drafted, the "Cox Proposal" read:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was decided on
the merits in State proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim(1) resulted in a decision that was based on an arbitraryor unreasonable interpretation of
clearly established Federal law as articulated in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States;
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an arbitraryor unreasonableapplication of the
facts of clearly established Federal law as articulated in the decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States; or
(3) resulted in a decision that was based on an arbitraryor unreasonabledetermination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State proceeding.
Id. at 433 (citing 141 CONG. REc. H1424 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995)).
242. Id. at 435.
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then, reasonable state court decisions could survive habeas review, even if
wrong; arbitrary decisions could not.24 3
Williams unmistakably echoes this "reasonable but not arbitrary" gloss
on section 2254(d). Were Williams explicating only the House's proposed
section 2254(d), the Court's "reasonableness" standard would surely be
consistent with legislative intent-if still otherwise unsustainable.2 44
But the path of section 2254(d) took another turn before passage, this
one in the Senate. As it considered the House's proposal, the Senate made
a number of modifications to section 2254(d). Some of these alterations
seem to be little more than quotidian editorial adjustments.2 45 But one of
these alterations exhibits more than a fastidious concern for precise
diction. The use of the disjunctive "or" between the "contrary to" and
"unreasonable application" clauses illustrates a significant substantive
concession, a careful and intentional effort to collapse the (supposed)
distinction between "unreasonable" and "wrong" state court decisions.246
This concession was a painful one for the Senate's habeas detractors,
critics who had had long sought 247 to require federal courts "to defer to
'reasonable' state court decisions on the merits--even if ... the state
judgment was in error. ,248 But the concession was a real and necessary
one; without it, AEDPA may not have survived the Senate249a fact not
lost on some of the more steadfast advocates of a "reasonableness"
shield. °
As it left Congress, then, section 2254(d) clearly required something: It
demanded that federal courts take "serious account" of the relevant state
court decision.25 1 But Congress's final version of section 2254(d) did not
plainly establish a "general rule of deference to 'reasonable' state court
decisions on questions of federal law. 252 Nor did it clearly impart a
distinction between "unreasonable" and "wrong" state court decisions.

243. Id.
244. See, e.g., Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15.
245. Yackle, supra note 35, at 432-36.
246. See id. at 437-38. When viewed through a precise grammatical lens, the latter modification
seems particularly clever. With a specific use of the disjunctive form, the Senate version seems to
render the questionable "unreasonable" prong "superfluous."
247. Id.
248. Id. at 438.
249. Without these concessions, Professor Yackle concludes, the bill would have lacked sufficient
votes for passage. Id.
250. Id. at 438, 422 (citations omitted); see also 142 CONG. REc. 7792 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996).
251. Yackle, supranote 35, at 383-84.
252. Id. at 384; see also id. at 443 (noting that such deep-kneed deference would constitute
"flagrant interference with the federal judicial function"); see also Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15.
The interplay of Williams and the "judicial Power" is discussed at length infra Part IV.
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In Williams, however, this distinction reappears 253-not through a
simple elaboration of congressional intent or "gnomic congressional
utterances, 2 54 but through a subtle judicial misinterpretation of section
2254(d). In Williams, the Court installs an uneasy gap between "wrong"
and "unreasonable"; in Williams, the Court compels deference to
"reasonably unconstitutional" state-court decisions.
D. Williams' Course
But how does the Court separate "wrong" from "unreasonable"? And
how does Williams enforce this separation, requiring federal courts to
defer to incorrect state court decisions?
Williams does so, in short, through an impermissible decisionmaking
model, its Swift-like unconstitutional course. 5
Like Swift's course before it, Williams' unconstitutional course
proceeds in two steps.256 Under Williams, the federal court must first
review the terms of the relevant state-court decision, asking whether that
decision somehow errs as a matter of "clearly established ' 257 Supreme
Court law. If there is no such error-i.e., if the state court correctly applied
Supreme Court law to fact-the federal court's analysis is at an end; there
is no state-court error to remedy, so the habeas petition must be denied.258
But if there is a state court error-if the state court did misapply law to

253.

Yackle, supra note 35, at 432-36.

254.

LAWRENCE

G.

SAGER,

JUSTICE

IN

PLAINCLOTHES:

A

THEORY

OF

AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 31-33 (2004) (noting that statutes often represent a "legislative strategy
of generality and incompleteness," the construction of a "broad legislative frame [that] ... invite[s] the
judiciary... to do much of the normative work").
255. The focus here is section 2254(d)'s "unreasonable application" prong.
256. Each step is necessary-as is the order in which they proceed. To detect threshold error,
federal courts must first ask if the state-court decided a federal question incorrectly; to determine if
that error is "unreasonable," federal courts must then attempt to quantify that error. See generally
Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847, 855 (2005)
(noting that this type of two-step decisional strategy informs qualified immunity, Fourth Amendment,
and harmless error cases as well).
257. For a time, "clearly established" seemed to be a rather uncontroversial portion of section
2254(d). It was, as Williams noted, a temporal limit, capturing only the "holdings, as opposed to the
dicta, of th[e] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S.
at 412. In Lockyer v. Andrade, however, the Court seemed to add a clarity limit to the temporal one,
concluding that the relevant principle must also be relatively easy to divine. See Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,
72 (2003) ("The difficulty with Andrade's position, however, is that our precedents in this area have
not been a model of clarity. Indeed, in determining whether a particular sentence for a term of years
can violate the Eighth Amendment, we have not established a clear or consistent path for courts to
follow.") (citations omitted). In so doing, Andrade changes the relevant test dramatically. It also calls a
great deal of the Court's habeas jurisprudence into doubt, for very little of this doctrine can be
described as a "model of clarity." Williams, quite obviously, cannot.
258. Under no standard, of course, will a federal court upset a correct state court decision.
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fact-the federal court's analysis is not at an end. The federal court must
instead attempt to quantify that error, to determine
if the error is somehow
"reasonable" and therefore worthy of deference.2 5 9
A slight variation on a familiar case-Chambers v. Mississippi26 0offers a more specific illustration of how Williams' two-step course works.
As in Chambers, the central question in this example is the constitutional
legitimacy of a Mississippi rule of criminal procedure.2 6' In this variation,
however, Mississippi does not prevent all criminal defendants from
impeaching their own witnesses. 2 62 Instead, Mississippi permits a
defendant to impeach his own witnesses-provided the defendant calls at
least two additional witnesses to challenge the impeached witness's
credibility.
During his criminal trial, Defendant D could not locate two suitable
"additional witnesses" to impeach deceitful Witness W. As a consequence,
Defendant D was convicted for an offense someone else had repeatedly
confessed to committing. 263 On state collateral review, Defendant D
challenged his conviction, arguing that Mississippi's "additional witness"
rule conflicts with the Sixth and the Fourteenth Amendments. 264 The
Mississippi Supreme Court disagreed.
In its decision, the Mississippi court readily acknowledges that
265
Chambers renders the "additional witnesses" rule inherently suspect.
But Chambers also recognizes a state's authority to bend the right to
confront and the right to cross-examine when necessary "to accommodate
other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. ,,266Al
All th
the
"additional witnesses" rule involves, the Mississippi court concludes, is

259. It bears emphasis that this hurdle is entirely distinct from AEDPA's many plainly procedural
limits (e.g., procedural default), all of which avoid or preempt consideration of the underlying merits
question.
260. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 1 use Chambers because of the relative paucity of Supreme Court
doctrine (i.e., "clearly established" law) regarding this type of question.
261. Id. at 285.
262. Id.at 291-93.
263. Just as Mr. Chambers was. Id. at 290 n.3.
264. The challenges grow from the Confrontation Clause and the Due Process Clause. Cf United
States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 307-08 n.3 (1998) ("He also briefly contends that the 'combined
effect' of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments confers upon him the right to a 'meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense'....") (citation omitted).
265. As Chambers makes clear, the right of cross-examination is "implicit in the constitutional
right of confrontation," 410 U.S. at 295 (citing, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)), an
"essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional
goal." Id. (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
266. Id. (noting that neither right is "absolute"-even if "its denial or significant diminution calls
into question the ultimate 'integrity of the fact-finding process' and requires that the competing
interest be closely examined") (citations omitted).
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this type of permissible bending; it does not violate the Sixth or the
Fourteenth Amendment.
To challenge this conclusion, Defendant D files a federal habeas
petition. The petition is not procedurally defective,267 so the federal court
may reach the merits of Defendant D's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
claims. And on these merits, the federal court concludes that the
Mississippi court misapplied the governing standard (viz., Chambers) to
the facts-i.e., that the state court decision was wrong.
Before the federal court may grant relief, however, Williams requires
the court to ask a second question: whether the state court's erroneous
decision was also "unreasonable."
How the court is supposed to identify this "unreasonableness" is
uncertain. 268 But so, too, is the demonstrable "unreasonableness" of the
Mississippi court's decision. Expedient and wrong as the Mississippi
court's decision seems, it does not depend on an entirely unreasonable
application of clearly established Supreme Court law. It merely depends
on an incorrectapplication of that law, which is precisely the kind of state
court error that Williams shields. 69
In the end, the federal habeas court may find that the Mississippi
court's decision was wrong and unreasonable; it may not. It may grant
habeas relief; it may not. The answer to Williams' second question surely
matters-not least to Defendant D.
But the very asking of that question matters as well, albeit in a less
obvious way. It matters because asking Williams' second question
compels federal courts to reach outcomes in an impermissible manner: It
requires courts to seek a kind of constitutional super-error, not
constitutional error alone; it forces courts to answer tautological questions
of "objective unreasonableness"; it orders courts to toe an indistinct line
between "deterministic objectivism" and "indeterministic subjectivism";
and it ties the federal courts' hands, preventing them from effectuating

267. See generally28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254, & 2261-66 (2000).
268. See, e.g., Lainfiesta v. Artuz, 253 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2001).
269. This logic leads in some rather troublesome directions. To make sense of our federalist
system, one must assume that state courts are, in general, appropriate tribunals for federal questions.
See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 876 (noting that state courts are, in theory, "entrusted [with]
the . . . role of keeping state law in conformity with 'the supreme Law of the Land"'); Scheidegger,
supra note 38, at 903 ("From the beginning, it has been understood that state courts were competent to
decide federal questions."). But how much do we trust state courts? And does the fact that a state court
has reached X conclusion make that conclusion de facto "reasonable"-no matter what the federal
court decides? See Meltzer, supra note 32, at 2522.
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their judgments-even after remediable "violat[ions of] the supreme law
of the land" 270 have been located.
These problems do more than raise minor methodological concerns.
They turn Williams' decisionmaking process into an unavoidably
unconstitutional endeavor, placing Williams-abiding courts on an
unconstitutional course.27 1
In this procedural sense, Williams is much like Swift: Each prescribes a
specific, unconstitutional decisionmaking framework. Each directs the
federal courts to reach outcomes in an impermissible way.
On close inspection, however, Williams is less a perfect reflection of
Swift than it is an unappealing image in photonegative. Where Swift
impermissibly increased federal power, allowing federal courts to
disregard state court decisions of state law, Williams impermissibly
diminishes federal power, forcing federal courts to defer to state court
decisions of federal law. And where Swift impermissibly expanded the
'judicial Power," allowing federal courts to create a body of general
common law, Williams impermissibly shrinks that "Power," requiring
federal courts to cede their decisional autonomy and to defer to incorrect
state court decisions.2 72
These differences are neither trivial nor abstract. Under Swift's course,
means and ends maintained a healthy distance: Since Swift's course left
ample room for federal courts to "find" the "right" answer-if in the
wrong way-there was no guarantee that some federal court outcomes
would be constitutionallywrong.
Williams' course provides just that type of guarantee. Under Williams,
there is no Swift-like decisional latitude, no room for federal courts to
ensure correct constitutional outcomes. Under Williams, in fact, federal
courts must stand ready to validate constitutional error. 273 They must, on
occasion, stamp the imprimatur of the federal courts on incorrect decisions

270. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 876, 881-84.
271. One might argue that the Court has placed a kind of "unconstitutional condition" on the
exercise of federal habeas jurisdiction. See generally Richard Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 TermForward: Unconstitutional Conditions,State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4

(1988); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1421-28
(1989). As Professor Meltzer has thoughtfully reminded, however, the "unconstitutional condition"
idea can only stretch so far, see Daniel Meltzer, Harmless Errorand ConstitutionalRemedies, 61 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 15 (1994) [hereinafter Meltzer, Harmless Error], and it does not apply cleanly here.
272. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 870-75.
273. Cf Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
ConstitutionalRemedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1777 (1991) ("[W]e do not dispute that Marbury v.

Madison requires courts seised of jurisdiction to apply all relevant law and thereby avoid in-court
violations of constitutional rights.") (citations omitted).

1718

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 83:1679

of federal law274 not because no constitutional error occurred or because
the error is of a type that cannot be remedied, but because the error falls
into Williams' purgatory, that constitutional nether-region in which
"reasonably unconstitutional" state court decisions survive. This joins
problematic means with problematic ends, running an unconstitutional
course into unconstitutional outcomes. It also poses a serious threat to
individual rights, to federal court integrity, and to the "judicial Power"
itself.
IV. THE

"UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURSE"

GOES ASTRAY

To a skeptical eye, the last claim is a curious one. It is no small thing to
suggest that a single Supreme Court decision raises questions about
individual rights, federal court integrity, and the "judicial Power." It goes
even a step further to claim that the decision does so simply by crafting a
seemingly innocuous decisionmaking framework.
But Williams, through its carefully oblique unconstitutional course,
does all of these things. This section examines a number of Williams'
doctrinal and deontological shortcomings. Subsection A explores
Williams' most prominent (if often overlooked) doctrinal impediment: the
terms and limits of United States v. Klein.275 Subsection B follows with a
brief discussion of how Williams' model involves an unsound type of
deference and an unsustainable separation of right from remedy.
Subsection C then offers a preliminary consideration of Williams' broader
rights- and judicial integrity-based problems, concentrating primarily on
the Court's self-limiting misuse of the "judicial Power."
A. Williams and Klein
United States v. Klein is a difficult case-not quite, as Professor Sager
reminds, Fermat's Last Theorem, but still far from "a model of clarity.' 2 76
Klein's story begins with the Abandoned and Captured Property Act
(ACPA), a Civil War-era bill designed to remunerate property owners in
insurrectionary states for the forced-sales of their property.277 Under the
APCA, Southern property owners could recoup the proceeds from these

274. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 873-74.
275. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
276. Sager, Klein's First Principle,supra note 21, at 2525. See also Tsen Lee, supra note 31, at
134 n.122; Scheidegger, supra note 38, at 922.
277. The Abandoned and Captured Property Act, 12 Stat. 820 (1863).
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forced-sales-provided those owners had offered no "aid or comfort" to
the rebellion.27 8
On its face, the APCA presented no steep problem of application. The
express terms of the Act made loyalty to the Union a prerequisite to
recovery. Participation in "any" type of insurrectionary activity proved,
without more, that a property owner was disloyal. The only pressing (fact)
question, then, was whether the particular property owner committed any
insurrectionary deeds, i.e., provided any "aid or comfort."
But a presidential proclamation greatly complicated the operation of
the Act's seemingly simple "aid or comfort" standard. This proclamation
extended to "persons who had been engaged in the rebellion a full
pardon-specifically inclusive of the restoration of their rights of
property-if they took and abided by an oath of allegiance. 2 79 In United
States v. Padelford,280 the Court read this pardon to "cleanse[]" all oathtakers of the sully of disloyalty; 28' even more, the Court interpreted the
taking of the oath to prove actual loyalty to the Union. All oath-takers,
then, could recover under the APCA-including those, like Mr. Padelford,
who had provided some "aid or comfort" to the rebellion.28 2 The APCA
was thus turned on its head.
Not surprisingly, Congress found Padelford entirely indefensibleboth in its treatment of presidential pardons and in its interference with the
APCA. So, in response, Congress quickly passed three 283 measures: First,
Congress attempted to undo the evidentiary impact of the pardons,
declaring pardons inadmissible as proof of loyalty; second, Congress
attempted to subvert the very thrust of the pardons, deeming the
acceptance of a pardon conclusive proof "that the recipient had given aid
and comfort to the rebellion"; and, third, the Congress attempted to
insulate its efforts from judicial review, divesting both the Court of Claims
and the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to hear cases in which the claimant
had accepted a pardon-including those cases, like Mr. Klein's, that were
already pending.284

278.
279.
280.
281.

Id.
Sager, Klein's FirstPrinciple,supra note 2 1, at 2525.
76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869).
Id.

282. Id.
283. This act actually offers four measures, see Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235,
but the second and the fourth steps run together, as both purport to tailor the courts' jurisdiction in
relevant cases. However many measures there are, any one of them may well have satisfied Congress's
desire. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 815, 817 (labeling Congress's overlapping measures a
kind of "belt and suspenders" response, a "redundant means" of accomplishing a Congress's goal).
284. Id.
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The Court rejected all three measures in Klein.
An important part of Klein focuses on Congress's failure to "give a
presidential pardon the pervasive effect demanded by the Constitution. 2 85
"[T]he President's [pardon] power," Klein explains, "is not subject to
legislation; [] Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor
exclude from its exercise any class of offenders. 286
But a more significant part of Klein touches on a different "separation
of powers principle," one relating to Congress's interaction with the
"Federal Judiciary,"2 87 not the Executive. This second separation of
powers principle, Klein observes, precludes Congress from prescribing a
"rule of decision" in a case already before a federal court.288
of0
Almost all congressional attempts to influence the outcome 29
289-legal
hackles.
judicial
raise
actions
finalized
already
pending--or
Most are treated quite unkindly by the Court.29'
But the "rule of decision" in Klein took an unusually insidious form: It
attempted to force the Court to disagree with its own still-viable
constitutional precedent.29 2 Had Congress had its way, the Supreme Court
would have been made to decide "against [the Court's] own best judgment
on matters within its competence" 293-indeed, on matters already decided
as a function of that "competence." Then as now, the Court is acutely
skeptical of this type of congressional tactic.294
On its facts, Klein may now seem almost trifling, a relic of zealous
postbellum politicking. But Klein is far from jurisprudentiallytrivial, even

285. See Sager, Klein's FirstPrinciple,supra note 21, at 2526; Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 14748; see generally Scheidegger, supra note 38, at 922 (suggesting that the statute's "most glaring
defect" was "its unconstitutional nullification of the presidential pardon").
286. Klein, 80 U.S. at 141 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
287. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 329 (2000).
288. See Klein, 80 U.S. at 146-47. One should be careful not to overstate this point. Congress has
prescribed rules of decision in pending cases before, and, on occasion, the Court has found no
constitutional problem in such rules. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 434-37
(1992); Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1944). The larger concern-in both Klein and
elsewhere-is whether the federal courts are precluded "from attending to the Constitution in arriving
at decision of the cause." See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 775 n.362 (quoting Herbert
Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1006 (1965)).
289. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,240 (1995).
290. See, e.g., Miller, 530 U.S. at 329.
291. Of course, "Congress tells courts how to decide cases, in a broad sense, every time it enacts a
rule of substantive law." Scheidegger, supra note 38, at 909 (adding that "[t]his power can even be
exercised by enacting a rule so narrow that it applies only to one pending case"-like Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1856)).
292. See Redish, supra note 22, at 715-16.
293. Sager, Klein's FirstPrinciple,supra note 21, at 2529.
294. See, e.g., Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417 (1995); Plaut, 514 U.S. at 211; Robertson v.
Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
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if the facts seem historically quaint. At its core, Klein teaches that
Congress may not demand that federal courts reach unconstitutional
decisions.29 5 When Congress makes such a demand, it does more than
exercise a valid legislative prerogative. It threatens the courts' autonomy,
296
their authority to decide cases "independently, finally, and effectively. 297
Worse still, it forces the courts to be complicit in their own repudiation,
odds with [their] foundational understandings of
to act at "deep conceptual
298
the Constitution.,
These "conceptual odds" are no less insistent, no less constitutionally
problematic, when dictated by an institution other than Congress. Klein's
primary lesson is that the federal courts should never be "put in the
position" of reaching or validating unconstitutional outcomes.2 99 Nothing
limits this principle to a specific inter-institutional dynamic; put more
colloquially, nothing requires that Congress do the "put[ting]."
Nothing should. Klein's fundamental principle can-and shouldapply as readily to Supreme Court demands as it does to congressional
ones. The principle can apply because the institutional dynamic is largely
irrelevant; the focus falls on what the courts have been made to do, not
who has made them do it. And the principle should apply because the

295. When placed in broader jurisprudential context, Klein also demonstrates that the greater does
not always include the lesser: Congress may exercise significant control over federal court jurisdiction;
it may even, on occasion, remove whole classes of cases from the purview of the federal courts. But
Congress may not leave jurisdiction in place only to demand that the Court reach unconstitutional
outcomes. See Scheidegger, supra note 38, at 954 (agreeing that Klein "actually does reject a greaterincludes- lesser argument"). See also Hart, supra note 20, at 1373 ("[l]f Congress directs an Article III
court to decide a case, I can easily read into Article III a limitation on the power of Congress to tell the
court how to decide it."); Lawson, supra note 11, at 201 ("Nor could Congress pass a general statute
providing, for example, that in any case raising a question concerning the constitutionality of a statute
restricting abortion, the court must rule for / against the plaintiff."); see also RICHARD FALLON ET AL.,
HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 368 (4th ed. 1996)
("[l]nvocation of the language of 'jurisdiction' is not a talisman, and ... not every congressional
attempt to influence the outcome of cases can be justified as the existence of a power over
jurisdiction."). It is worth stressing that these outcomes are not unconstitutional in some inchoate or
impressionistic sense; they are unconstitutional in light of what the Court itself has already said. See
Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 2540 (1998)
[hereinafter Congress] ("Congress may not compel the courts to speak a constitutional untruth.").
296. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 773, 822; see also id. at 820 ("On the independent
interpretation point for which Marbury is famous, but which it only silently decided, Klein is
explicit."); see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996) ("Even when a branch does not
arrogate power to itself.., the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair another
in the performance of its constitutional duties.").
297. See Sager, Klein's First Principle,supranote 21, at 2529.
298. Sager, supra note 5, at 87-88; see also Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218 (noting that courts should not
be made to exercise their jurisdiction in "a manner repugnant to the text, structure, and traditions of
Article 1Il").
299. See Sager, supra note 5, at 88-89.
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resulting jurisprudential "charade 30 0 is always the same: Federal courts
have been allowed to address the merits of particular cases only to be
compelled30 in
some instances to reach incorrect (and unconstitutional)
1
outcomes.
This "charade" is no less pernicious when directed by the Court. It is, if
anything, only more so. 30 2 Yet in Williams a version of this "charade"
reappears-with the Court writing the script.30 3 Like Congress did in
Klein, Williams precludes federal courts "from attending to the
Constitution" in arriving at some of their decisions.30 4 In some cases, in
fact, Williams affirmatively requires federal courts to validate incorrect
(and unconstitutional) results-so long as those results are somehow
"reasonable." Unlike Congress's efforts in Klein, however, Williams'
demand appears subtly, taking a misleadingly innocuous proceduralform.
But the demand is still an insidious one-even in its discreet guise.
This guise is only more remarkable for the span of its influence. Under
Williams, state courts may stray from binding Supreme Court authority, so
long as they remain "reasonably" close to it.30 5 Federal courts, in turn,
must stray from binding Supreme Court authority, ratifying "reasonably
unconstitutional" departures from Supreme Court law. This is what
Williams requires. It is also what Klein prohibits.
B. Deference, Remedies, and How Williams is Worse
This does not mean, of course, that Williams is a complete
jurisprudential anomaly. In some ways, Williams even seems familiar:
Federal courts often defer to other adjudicative bodies, whether judicial or

300. See Sager, Klein's FirstPrinciple,supra note 21, at 2528.
301. Sager, supra note 5, at 88-89.
302. As Professor Fallon has noted, "[i]t would be pointless to uphold a constitutional right to
judicial review when relief could not be granted even if the plaintiff should prevail on the merits."
Fallon, supra note 23, at 370.
303. This fact alone distinguishes Williams from the more typical "judicial Power" case. See, e.g.,
Vermeule, supra note 6, at 357-58 ("My subject is a common separation-of-powers claim: that a
statute violates the constitutional grant of 'judicial power' to the courts.") (citing Haybum's Case, 2
U.S. (2 DalI.) 409 (1792); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146-47 (1871), Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51, 54-57 (1932), Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995), and
Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000)).
304. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 775 n.362 (citation omitted).
305. For a truly trenchant study of a similar pressure, see Daniel Meltzer, Harmless Error,supra
note 271, at 5 (explaining that Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), is "best viewed as a rule of
constitutional conunon law, born of the concern that state courts, if left free to apply their own
harmless error standards, would dilute federal constitutional norms by too easily finding that
constitutional errors were not prejudicial").
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administrative. 30 6 Federal courts also leave some constitutional wrongs
unremedied, both in the habeas context 30 7 and outside of it. 308 By these two
analogical measures, Williams hardly looks unusual. Its deference to state
courts may seem but an extension of a larger jurisprudential trend; 30 9 its
"reasonably unconstitutional" standard may seem to pry a preexisting
310
rights-remedies gap only a bit wider.
But Williams' "charade" is more than a reprise of things seen
elsewhere. Williams' deference, its conception of rights and remedies, its
doctrinal disregard-all are unusual, and troublingly so.
Williams does not, for example, demand deference to alternative
tribunals of superior competence, as do certain parts of administrative law
doctrine.31 1 Instead, Williams demands a ceding of federal court authority
over federal questions (on the merits) to state courts3 12-none of which
possesses any special decisional capacity.
Nor does Williams demand a pardoning of "intermittent official
misconduct," 3 13 as does qualified immunity. Instead, Williams demands a
pardoning of state court judicial errors, an absolution of adjudicative
mistakes made by state courtjudges.
And Williams does not simply uncouple right from remedy-as federal
courts sometimes do. 314 Instead, Williams sketches a porous remedial line,

306. See generally Pettys, supranote 176, at 765-69.
307. Because of, e.g., AEDPA's many procedural hurdles. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2244, 2261-66
(2000).
308. Because of, e.g., qualified immunity. See Healy, supra note 256; Fallon, Some Confusions,
supra note 23, at 311 ("The dictum of Marbury v. Madison notwithstanding, there is no right to an
individually effective remedy for every constitutional violation.").
309. See Woolhandler, supranote 30, at 636.
310. See Jeffries, supra note 57, at 87-88.
311. Cf Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See also
Neubome, supra note 58; Gary Peller, supra note 161, 691 (noting that the idea that "state courts are
as solicitous of federal claims as are federal courts[] lacks support... "); Jonathan Masur, A Hard
Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative Law and Military Deference, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441 (2005).
312. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 876 (discussing the "unconstitutional 'decision[s]' of...
the 'judges in every State'). In our fictional version of Mississippi, for example, the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments do permit the additional witnesses rule.
313. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 876; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-27
(1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982); Shank v. Naes, 773 F.2d 1121, 1125-26
(10th Cir. 1985) (noting that courts do not expect police officers to make especially nuanced legal
determinations); Amsberg v. United States, 757 F.2d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 1985).
314. To borrow Professor Woolhandler's perfect summary, the "controverted issue is not whether
there will be a gap between right and remedy, but rather, how wide that gap should be." Woolhandler,
supra note 30, at 636; see also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 273, at 1799 ("[B]oth the Supreme Court
and 'inferior' courts often resolve constitutional questions without providing relief."). In the last
decade, Professors Fallon and Meltzer have developed a "theory of constitutionally required
remedies," a framework that builds from two "general principles":
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prohibiting federal courts from employing a still-extant remedy in cases
where that remedy is both available and appropriate. 3
It has long been clear that neither Congress nor the Court need provide
the "best" remedy for every wrong.3t 6 In the habeas context, there may be
no constitutional requirement that petitioners receive any federal remedy
at all. 3 17 So, should the Court (or Congress) wish to redefine the
underlying right or to modify the attendant remedy, it may well have the
power to do so quite dramatically.31 8

First, a strong though not unyielding presumption that there should be individually effective
redress for violations of constitutional rights-a presumption that can be outweighed by
practical imperatives; and second, a more general, but also more unyielding, structural
principle that constitutional remedies must be adequate to keep government generally within
the bounds of law.
Meltzer, Congress, supra note 295, at 2559 (discussing Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 273, at 1787-89
("Of the two functions performed by constitutional remedies, providing effective remediation to
individual victims is the more familiar, but ensuring governmental faithfulness to law is, if not the
more fundamental, at least the more unyielding.") (citation omitted)).
Habeas relief has never fit comfortably within this "constitutionally required" frame, in part
because of history, see Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 273, at 1813 ("History marks federal habeas
corpus as constitutionally gratuitous as a means of postconviction review.") (citations omitted), and in
part because of "the availability of other[]" remedial forms, see Meltzer, Congress, supra note 295, at
2563 ("[T]he central point is that famously emphasized by Henry Hart-that the constitutionality of
with&awing particular remedies depends upon the availability of others.") (citation omitted), however
"aleatory" those other forms may be. Woolhandler, supra note 30, at 642 ("Presumably, if the state
court provides postdeprivation process but inappropriately denies relief for such violations, the only
federal court remedy for the loss is direct review in the Supreme Court, a remedy that is aleatory at
best."). See also John Harrison, Jurisdiction,CongressionalPower, and ConstitutionalRemedies, 86
GEO. L.J. 2513, 2518-19 (1998) ("[T]he Court's assumption is that although the Constitution contains
rules of conduct for federal officers and identifies people who are entitled to some kind of judicial
remedy for violations of those rules of conduct, the Constitution does not, by itself, resolve the
question of the appropriate remedy."); Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution
as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1532 (1972).
315. See Fallon, supra note 23, at 370.
316. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term, Forward: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975). "The law of remedies," Professors Fallon and Meltzer have
reminded, "is largely conventional, and what counts as a full or adequate remedy is scarcely less so."
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 273, at 1779-80 (citation omitted); id. at 1778 (asking if there must "be
an effective remedy for every such violation-and if so, what, exactly, does 'effective' mean... "); id.
at 1787 ("Even in cases in which the Constitution requires some remedy, Hart showed that it
frequently leaves an element of discretion or flexibility about what that remedy should be.").
317. Id.; see also Woolhandler, supranote 30, at 636.
318. Compare Daniel Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J.
2537, 2554 (1998) (arguing that Congress is not "the exclusive institution with authority to furnish
distinctively federal remedies for constitutional violations") (citation omitted), with Harrison, supra
note 314, at 2519 ("The congressional power at issue under this analysis is the power to prescribe and
limit the remedies available in federal court. The extent of Congress's structural remedial power is
quite important in the case in which Congress has power over the remedy but not over the cause of
action.").
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But Williams changes neither the underlying fight nor the attendant
remedy, at least in a direct way. 319 Nor does it rework the basic connection
between the two. Instead, Williams leaves the fight in place and the
remedy largely unmodified-and then deems habeas sometimes
different.320 Some violations of the Sixth Amendment, for example, will
warrant habeas relief under Williams' test; others will not.
Worse than forcing habeas courts to treat analogous cases differently,
this prohibits federal courts from effectuating a still-extant remedy in cases
where that remedy is decidedly appropriate.3 21 What seems like a slight
expansion of an existing fight-remedy gap proves, in truth, a significant
recasting of the meaning and effect of constitutional error overall-in
some cases.
C. Right Answers?
So Williams suffers some serious flaws. But are Williams' defects real?
Are they meaningful theoretically and practically? Or do they depend on a
hollow epistemological premise, an unsustainable belief that322there is a
"fight answer" to be found-and that federal courts can find it?
Much has been written in the last half-century about the so-called
indeterminacy thesis, the notion that legal questions have no correct
answers-or at least unique correct answers.323 Some scholars advocate
this indeterminacy thesis in its most potent form, arguing that the law
inevitably fails to "provide concrete, real answers to particular legal or

319. And at no point does Williams proclaim that habeas is simply different, entirely sui generis in
the realm of federal litigation. One might say, of course, that this observation gets us nowhere, that
Williams simply does what Congress could have accomplished by statute. Congress could, the
argument runs, demand "unreasonableness," just as Congress could amend a statute-say, the Federal
Tort Claims Act-to prohibit relief unless the relevant defendant's conduct was reckless. Such a
change in the FTCA may be bad policy, but it would not be unconstitutional-andWilliams seems to
do much the same thing.
But Williams and the "reckless" standard differ in at least one important way: The "reckless"
standard changes the substantive reach of one particular law. Williams does far more: It leverages
"reasonableness" to change the reach of countless provisions of substantive (constitutional) law, and it
does so in a way that keeps courts from applying law as otherwise prescribed. This is the Klein
problem. Even if Williams does not seem to prescribe a rule of decision in any particular case, it does
prescribe a broader, more insidious "rule of decision" in a category of habeas cases-and that rule
precludes courts from effectuating still valid constitutional precedent.
320. This inter-habeas split may be worse than divesting courts of their habeas powers outright, a
move that would be both obvious and dubious for other reasons.
321. See Fallon, supra note 23, at 370.
322. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 157, at 446.
323.

(2004).

See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 86-90
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social problems. ''324 Others stake a less doctrinaire position, 325 suggesting
that the law is only indeterminate where it would seem to matter most-to
wit, in "important cases." 326 And some disagree with this indeterminacy
premise altogether, depicting the 327
law "as a seamless web" with one "right
answer" for every legal question.
By now, the defects of this "right answer thesis" are well chronicled.32 8
However viscerally powerful the right answer thesis may appear,329 even
the idea's modem architect seems to have withdrawn from it slightly, if
not "jettisoned" it altogether.33 °
But the flaws of the right answer thesis have not deterred the Court
from accepting it, if in a manifestly indirect way. "Governing doctrine,"
"controlling opinions," "binding precedent"-these phrases may be little
more than elements in a "conventional discourse," empty words in cases

324. Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing CriticalDogma, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 462, 464 (1987) [hereinafter On the Indeterminacy Crisis] (citing, e.g., David Kairys, Law and
Politics, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243, 244, 247 (1984); Joseph William Singer, The Player and the
Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); James Boyle, The Politics of Reason:
Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685 (1985); Gary Peller, The
Metaphysics ofAmerican Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1985)).
325. Id. at 488-91 (defining "weak" indeterminacy as the "claim that all interesting or important
cases are indeterminate").
326. Id.
327. See DWORKIN, supra note 69, at 331-38; DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 231, at ch. 5;
RONALD DWORKIN, Pragmatism, Right Answers and True Banality in Pragmatism, in LAW AND
SOCIETY 359 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991); STEPHEN GUEST, RONALD DWORKIN
137-43 (1991); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 273, at 1759 ("Among contemporary jurisprudential
writers, Ronald Dworkin might appear a spiritual heir to Blackstone. Like Blackstone, Dworkin
depicts law as a seamless web, and he maintains that all legal questions have one right answer."). See
also LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 24-30 (1991);
Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 875, 898 (2003)
[hereinafter Dorf, Legal Indeterminancy]; Michael S. Moore, Remembrance of Things Past, 74. S.
CAL. L. REv. 239, 246 (2000); Michael C. Dorf, Book Review, Truth, Justice, and the American
Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 133, 150-51 (1997).
328. See, e.g., Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 327, at 898-900; David Luban, The Coiled
Serpent of Argument: Reason, Authority, and Law in a Talmudic Tale, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253,
1270 ("Dworkin's right-answer thesis, even if true, settles nothing."). For a related critique, see
Richard Posner, The Jurisprudenceof Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 828 (1988), in which Judge
Posner explores an "ontological skepticism" that impacts "legal factfinding [and] legal reasoning"-as
well as "epistemological skepticism" that questions the existence of "invisible entities" like "justice"
and "legislative intent."
329. See, e.g., Charles Fried, A Meditation on the FirstPrinciplesof JudicialEthics, 32 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1227, 1243 (2004) ("I plead guilty as well ... to being a long time adherent to what Ronald
Dworkin over the years and in many essays has called the right answer thesis .... ").
330. Ken Kress, Book Review, Modern Jurisprudence,PostmodernJurisprudence,and Truth, 95
MICH. L. REv. 1871, 1888 (1997) (book review) ("Even Ronald Dworkin, who famously proposed the
controversial right answer thesis in his early work, has backed away from it-Joseph Raz claims he
has 'jettisoned' it-in more recent writings.").
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where "reasonable minds" could disagree."' But even in the most difficult
of cases, the Court has long required inferior federal courts to locate "right
answers"--to "plumb the nuances of settled authorities," in
Professors
' 332
Fallon and Meltzer's apt terms, "to reach 'correct' decisions."
By this measure, Williams runs precisely the wrong direction: It
implies that, "in hard and disputable cases, ' 333 federal courts cannot (and
need not) find the "'correct"' answer-or at least that they may not
consistently enforce this "'correct"' answer once they reach it. In so doing,
Williams contradicts the federal court's duty "to reach 'correct' decisions"
on matters of substantive law, and it turns federal courts into (sometimes
reluctant 334) institutional critics of legal determinacy.
But Williams also runs the wrong way without the "right answer
thesis," albeit in a less obvious manner. It may be true that many cases are
"hard, 33 5 leaving courts without easy "right" answers. It may also be true
that outcomes in these "hard" cases are truly indeterminate, leaving ample
room for "reasonable" jurists to disagree.3 36 And it may even be true that
this indeterminacy is of a moderated kind, leaving courts a "range" of
"reasonable" outcomes. From all of this, it may follow that Williams
strikes an epistemologically valid chord,337 landing safely between outright
"determinis[tic]
objectivism"
and
unfiltered
"indeterministic
' 338
subjectivism.
But it does not follow that Williams' epistemological shrewdness
works-as a matter of constitutional law or otherwise. It does not follow,

331. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 273, at 1748 (discussing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407
(1990)).
332. Id. at 1762.
Practical concerns thus favor a conception of law and judging that calls for decisions to turn
on the spirit of precedents, as best they can be understood, and that recognizes a judicial
obligation of fidelity that extends beyond indisputable cores of settled meaning.... In other
words, in the vast run of cases the Court joins Dworkin, Hart, and all but the most starkly
positivist jurisprudential thinkers ....
Id.
333. Id.
334. See, e.g., Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000).
335. See Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis, supra note 324, at 470.
336. Id.
337. "After all," Professor Bator tells us:
[t]here is no ultimate guarantee that any tribunal arrived at the correct result; the conclusions
of the habeas corpus court, or of any number of habeas corpus courts, that the facts were X
and that on X facts Y law applies are not infallible; if the existence vel non of mistake
determines the lawfulness of the judgment, there can be no escape from a literally endless
relitigation of the merits because the possibility of mistake always exists.
Bator, supranote 157, at 447.
338. Pettys, supra note 176, at 776-78.
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in other words, that state courts should be empowered to resolve the
"hard" cases, particularly on questions offederal law.33 9
Some have persuasively argued, of course, that "state courts ... are the
primary guarantors of constitutional rights, and in many cases they may be
the ultimate ones., 340 If Congress retains "plenary power to limit federal
jurisdiction," the logic runs, it must also hold the power to "force
proceedings to be brought, if at all, in a state court. 3 4' This seems an
inevitable (if also "naively blind" and "unthinkable, 342) extension of the
Constitution's federalist theme, at least when there is no federal court
review.
But when there is federal court review, state courts are not the
"ultimate" arbiters of federal law. The "judicial Power" of Article III
assigns that role to federal courts-even when the federal review takes
habeas form. 343 This "judicial Power" obligates federal courts to decide
questions of federal law "independently, finally, and effectively. 344 In this
sense, Williams turns the "judicial Power"345on its head, inviting state courts
to redefine the contours of federal rights.

339. See Steiker, supra note 161, at 888 (noting that the "transformation" of the writ between
1789 and 1868 "strongly supports the writ's role in protection national rights in a national forum").
340. Hart, supra note 20, at 1401.
341. Id. at 1363-64.
342. Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal
Jurisdiction,65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 237-38 & n. 112, 250 (1985).
343. This argument runs quite closely to the "federal right / federal forum" theory, the notion that
all federal questions merit federal court review. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 157, at 507 (noting that,
during a portion of his testimony before the Senate, Thurgood Marshall argued that "[flederal
questions should be determined by the Federal judiciary") (citation omitted): Fallon & Meltzer, supra
note 273, at 1813 nn.454-56 (discussing the Court's treatment of this theory). As Professor Meltzer
has reminded, "the argument that federal rights should be litigated, sooner or later, in a federal forum
can[not] alone carry the day." Meltzer, supra note 32, at 2509. So perhaps there are federal questions
appropriately deprived of federal review-at least in certain contexts. Once federal review begins,
however, it should be real and convincing, even if that review takes habeas form. See Bator, supra note
157, at 449 ("[T]here is no a priori reason why we should not decide that the most acceptable
arrangement for the decision of such questions is that all such state-court determinations should be
reviewed by a federal district court on collateral attack."); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On
Extrajudicial ConstitutionalInterpretation,110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1997); cf Paul M. Bator,
The State Courts and FederalConstitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 636 (1981)
(distinguishing direct and collateral review carefully).
344. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 773, 822. To say that state courts should have the final
say on these questions is to argue for the end of modem habeas law, not for the putatively modified
version of habeas Williams purports to offer.
345. There is plenty to say in favor of state court participation in adjudication of federal rights.
See. e.g., Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism,82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 397-400 (1997) (discussing the
states as laboratories of experimentation); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of
Law: Printz and Principle?, I ll HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2213-14 (1998); but cf Frank B. Cross, The
Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2002); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley,
Federalism. Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 903 (1994). But the famous
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This process of redefinition may take place only at the margins-like
Professor Monaghan's famous "federalism 'at the edges. ' ' , 346 But this
process promises a profoundly negative end, one that risks fragmenting
and diminishing constitutional rights. Since Williams strips federal courts
of the power to correct "reasonably unconstitutional" state court decisions,
it opens a window (however slightly) for state courts to "upset welldefined expectations about the content" of federal rights.3 47 As this
window opens, federal rights will come to mean (somewhat) different
things in different states. The resulting "patchwork without pattern ' 348 will
promise something worse than a tolerable level of rights-related
inconsistency; 349 it will promise a recalibration-and ineluctable scaling
back 3 5 -of substantive rights, all through the mechanism of a deferential
proceduralmodel.
There is, as Professor Vermeule has noted, a "mountain of scholarship"
addressing the "common problem" of "legislative encroachment on
judicial prerogatives. 35 1 Some of this scholarship recounts the CongressCourt tension in meticulous detail. 352 Some locates the Congress-Court
dialogue in historical and social context. 353 And some offers hopeful

states-as-laboratories notion, however philosophically attractive, does not itself excuse a whittling
away of the federal judicial power, nor does it permit a disregard of the Court's authoritative
interpretation of substantive constitutional provisions. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 343, at
1362.
346. Monaghan, supra note 316, at 36.
347. Id.
348. ELY, supra note 10, at 146.
349. See Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV.
403, 428 (1996) ("From the earliest days of the nation's history, no function of the Court has ranked
higher than the protection of federal right from hostility or misunderstanding on the part of state
courts."); cf. Steiker, supra note 161, at 865 ("[T]here is some reason to believe that the Framers
designed the Suspension Clause principally to promote federalism-to ensure that Congress would not
interfere with the power of state courts to afford habeas relief tofederal prisoners.").
350. It is "wrong," Professor Chemerinsky is careful to note, "to presuppose that decisions in
favor of [individual liberties] are preferable" to decisions in favor of "government interests." Erwin
Chemerinksy, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
233, 258 (1988). But when state courts are permitted to stray from "clearly established" Court
doctrine, the question is not whether rights should trump governmental interests. The question, rather,
is whether rights have trumped government interests according to the Supreme Court. Williams does
not simply invite state courts to draw unexpected shapes on a clean constitutional slate. It allows them
to ignore the shapes the Court has already drawn, coloring outside preexisting lines.
351. See Vermeule, supra note 6, at 358.
352. See, e.g., Symposium, Exordium, Suspension and Supremacy, Judicial Power and
Jurisdiction: The Availability and Scope of Habeas Corpus after AEDPA and IIRIRA, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 695 (1998) [hereinafter COLUM. L. REV. Symposium]; Symposium, Congress and the Courts:
Jurisdictionand Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445 (1998) [hereinafter GEO. L.J. Symposium].
353. Gunther, supra note 7, at 895-900.

1730

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 83:1679

solutions to this "common [inter-institutional] problem," cures that often
depend on the judiciary's interest in self-protection.35 4
There are no such cures when the Court opts to self-enervate. When the
Court derogates its own powers-as it does in Williams-there are no
clear solutions.35 5 At first blush, of course, Williams' decisionmaking
system may not seem to demand a solution; it may seem an innocuous,
even irrelevant decisional form, a curious inversion of Swift's overinflation of federal court power. But Williams' structure is far from
harmless.35 6 The integrity of the federal courts, the operation of those
courts, the meaning of substantive-right guarantees-all are at increased
risk because of Williams' unassuming decisionmaking model, its
unconstitutional course.
V. CONCLUSION

It has been a long time since Senator William King called the Supreme
Court "our 'Ark of the Covenant,"' our final "bulwark for the safety and
protection of the States and the people." 357 It has been long enough, in
fact, that political threats "to weaken or impair the power and the authority
of... our judicial system" no longer "arouse grave apprehensions in the
minds of all thoughtful
Americans." 358 If anything, such threats now do
359
precisely the opposite.
Of course, these threats rarely materialize. However noisy they may be,
the calls to rein in "runaway" federal courts are almost always more smoke
than fire.
But smoke can be distracting, and it has obscured another potent hazard
to the federal judiciary: the Supreme Court itself. In the last decade, the
Court has itself "weaken[ed and] impair[ed] the power and authority" of
the federal courts.360 It has done so by reshaping its own "judicial
Power"-not through bold pronouncements or obvious doctrinal revisions,

354. See, e.g., COLUM. L. REv. Symposium, supra note 352; GEO. L.J. Symposium, supra note
352.
355. "The Constitution [may] contemplate[] a judicial 'check' on the political branches," Fallon &
Meltzer, supra note 273, at 1788, but it envisions no structural "judicial 'check"' on itself.
356. The "blinders" are no less troubling because the Court has "volunteer[ed]" to wear them.
Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 851.
357. See Barry Friedman, The History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part Four: Law's
Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 971, 1041 n.317 (2000) (citing Court Change Foes Hold Senate Lead,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1937, at 15).
358. Id.
359. See Editorial, supra note 8.
360. Court Change Foes Hold Senate Lead, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1937, at 15 (quoting Sen.
William H. King).
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but through the prescription of unconstitutional decisionmaking
procedures, the charting of unconstitutional courses.
It is easy to gainsay the importance of procedure, to think of procedure
as nothing more than a means to an (appropriate) end. But there is nothing
trivial about unconstitutional courses. Some of these courses await full
exploration. Qualified immunity and Fourth Amendment doctrine, for
example, merit scrutiny through an "unconstitutional course" lens. Some
courses capture important historical and philosophical moments. Swift's
course, for example, helps chronicle the rise and fall of a natural-law
theory of jurisprudence. 361 And some courses present real-if shroudeddangers to individual litigants' rights, to federal court integrity, and to the
"judicial Power" overall. Williams' course, for example, ties this "judicial
Power" in intricate knots.362
These knots are real, but they are too readily overlooked. Their
unexpected source and their subtle form make it too easy to ignore the
Court's unconstitutional courses. Yet where Congress has so often failed,
the Court has quietly succeeded: By charting unconstitutional courses, the
Court has refashioned the "judicial Power" in an untenable way.
So there may well be a lesson in Congress's long record of jurisdictionstripping failure. It may suggest that Congress's persistent efforts are mere
political theater. It may suggest that the federal courts are in no real
danger, that the "judicial Power" is unthreatened. Or it may suggest that
the "judicial Power" is indeed threatened-but that we have been too busy
watching the wrong fight to notice.

361. Seesupra Part 1I.
362. Seesupra Parts II1& IV.

